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INTRODUCTION

The American Cancer Society recommends that Breast
self-Exams (BSEs) be performed on a regular monthly basis.
The recommendation stems from the knowledge that when breast
cancer is diagnosed at an early stage, the survival rates
are relatively high (American cancer Society, 1983), and
further, that a monthly BSE can aid in the early detection
of malignant breast lumps (e.g., Foster & Costanza, 1984).
Regardless of the minimum effort required by women to
perform BSEs (5 minutes per month), very few women adhere to
the American Cancer Society's recommendation (e.g., Bennett
et al., 1983).
What are the sources of resistance by women to perform
BSEs?

Previous research has enumerated several: doing BSE

requires women to perform an infrequent behavior (e.g.,
Carstensen & O' Grady, 1980; Grady, 1984; Zapka & Mamon,
1982), to learn to perform a specific skill (e.g., Edwards,
1980; Hill et al., 1982), and to perform a behavior that,
due to its private nature, may receive little external
reinforcement (e.g., Grady, Goodenow

&

Wolk, 1984).

The

purpose of the present research is to bring light to other
potential sources of resistance to BSE performance, drawing
1
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on past relevant research, and especially that from social
cognition, as a basis for forming plausible and testable
ideas.

More specifically, the present research draws on

concepts of psychological control and examines how different
types of messages might affect one's feelings of control.
Further, the research examines how those feelings of control
might translate into one's attitudes, intentions, and
behaviors with respect to breast self-exams.

REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE
Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987) Study
Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987), in their attempt to
understand the resistance to perform breast self-exams,
proposed that in the short run, BSE is a risky behavior that
involves uncertain outcomes.

Performing BSE does not

prevent cancer; it detects cancer (Leventhal

&

Watts, 1966).

In their study, Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) invoke the
framing postulate of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979, 1982;
Tversky

&

Kahneman, 1981) prospect theory to predict

decisions to perform BSE.

The framing postulate proposes

that people encode information relevant to risky decisions
in terms of potential gains or potential losses with respect
to some flexible and psychologically determined reference
point such as health.

Because different presentations of

factually equivalent information are postulated to change
the location of the reference point, such framing
manipulations can influence whether people encode
information as gains or losses.

Further, the postulate

assumes that losses, which in their absolute value are
equivalent to gains, are weighted more heavily in
3
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peoples' minds.

Thus, the postulate, by assuming that

greater emphasis is attributed to losses and that framing
manipulations affect whether outcomes are encoded as gains
or losses, predicts that risky behavioral choices will be
more likely when information is framed in terms of the
losses associated with behavioral choices.

Invoking the

framing postulate in their study, Meyerowitz and Chaiken
(1987) tested the hypothesis that a pamphlet promoting BSE
compliance would be more effective if it contained strong
arguments stressing the negative consequences of not
performing BSE rather than equally strong arguments
stressing the positive consequences of performing BSE, their
assumption being that performing BSE is perceived by women
to be a risky behavior.
Finding support for their hypothesis, the authors
attempt to rule out three alternative explanations for their
findings that they had anticipated.

The first alternative

explanation is the negativity bias effect in person
perception and decision-making research--the finding that
negative information exerts a greater judgmental impact than
objectively equivalent positive information (e.g.,
Anderson, 1965; Birnbaum, 1972; Fiske, 1980; Slovic &
Lichenstein, 1968).

In other words, negative information is

weighted more heavily because it is perceptually more
salient or vivid to people who view the world as basically
positive (Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; Sears & Whitney, 1972).

5

The second alternative explanation is that negative
information is confounded by its fearful content.

In fact,

research investigating fear appeals has generally found that
high-fear (negative) messages are more persuasive than lowfear (positive) messages (e.g., Higbee, 1969; Leventhal,
1970; and Sutton, 1982).
Whether or not Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987)
successfully ruled out the first two alternative
explanations for their findings is debatable for two
reasons.

First, the measures they used to detect negativity

bias and fear arousal in the first posttest were not used
again in the second posttest.

Second, Meyerowitz and

Chaiken (1987) asked subjects to recall the content of their
respective messages, a measure that may not have elicited
the types of cognitive responses capable of revealing the
possible influence of the negativity bias and fear arousal
on subsequent attitudes, intentions, and behaviors.
Numerous studies have supported the notion that cognitive
responses, or units of information pertaining to an object
or issue that are the result of cognitive processing
(Cacioppo et al., 1981) can, in fact, mediate attitude
change, and under certain conditions, can also mediate
behavior change.
What kinds of cognitive responses might mediate such
attitude and behavior change?

Classification of cognitive

responses (Cacioppo et al., 1981) in past research has

6

yielded three response dimensions: 1) polarity, or the
degree to which the response is in favor of or opposed to
the advocacy; 2) origin, or the primary source of the
information contained in the subject's response; and 3)
target, or the focus at which the response is directed.

In

addition to those dimensions, the dimensions of saliency
(how often the cognitive response is elicited) and
processing mode (emotionality of the response) could provide
great insight into potentially mediating variables of
subjects' subsequent attitudes, intentions, and behaviors.
For example, in the context of Meyerowitz and Chaiken•s
(1987) study, would subjects in the loss-framed condition
have mentioned negative information more than subjects in
the gain-framed condition would have mentioned positive
information?

Similarly, would subjects in the loss-framed

condition have expressed greater fear elicited by their
messages than subjects in the gain-framed condition?
Answers to such questions cannot be ascertained given the
procedure Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) used to elicit the
above types of responses.
The third explanation Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987)
explore is that the framing manipulation might affect
women's BSE attitudes and behavior via its influence on one
or more variables given importance as predictors of health
behavior within protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975,
1983; Rogers & Mewborn, 1976) and the related health belief

7

model (Becker, 1974; Becker & Maiman, 1975).

Those

variables are perceived severity of breast cancer, perceived
susceptibility to breast cancer, perceived efficacy of BSE
as a coping response, and perceived self-efficacy in
performing BSE.

Only the last was found to differentiate

between the women in the loss- and gain-framed information
groups in their study.
Personal Control as a Mediating Variable
For some reason, women exposed to the loss-framed
information did adhere to the American Cancer Society's
recommendation that BSEs be performed monthly more than did
the women exposed to the gain-framed information.

What

process, if not fear arousal, salience, or those variables
discussed by the protection motivation theory, might underly
Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987) potentially fruitful
finding?

With the exception of prospect theory's implicit

assumption that a loss (vs. gain) frame increases motivation
for risk-seeking behavior, most prior research on positive
vs. negative appeals provides little insight into the
cognitive and affective mechanisms that might underly the
greater persuasiveness of a loss-framed message.
In the only past persuasion study explicitly guided by
prospect theory's framing postulate, Yates (1982) studied
consumers' decisions to purchase energy-saving devices for
their homes.

She found that a negatively (vs. positively)

8

framed message enhanced persuasiom, but only when the
message advocated a low- (vs. highl-) cost energy device.
common sense would allow for such a finding--obvious1y, no
one wants to pay a large sum of m(l)ney, regardless of the
negativity associated with not paring such a sum.
in the long run, such a purchase 'Wfould pay off.

However,
What then,

is the source of resistance to engraging in a high-cost
behavior when, in the long run, swch a behavior would yield
savings?

What would be the result- of a study that

manipulated both a loss- and gain-·framed message along with
a high- and low-cost message?

The.se questions and their

non-empirically based answers sugg·ested to me that
underlying the behavior, in both economic and health
domains, could be the construct of psychological control.
Some have argued that person.al control is integral to
self-concept and self-esteem, cons-tituting a fundamental
psychological need (Bandura, 1977;

de Charms, 1968;

Fenichel, 1945; Hendrick, 1942; R.

W. White, 1959).

In the

last few years, researchers have beegun to examine locus of
control in the context of heal th attti tudes and behaviors.
Scale development has been one avemue of research.
scale developed by Lau-ware (1982)
Heal th Locus of Control scale.

One

is the multidimensional

Thee scale contains four

subscales: self-control over healtl:h (beliefs in the efficacy
of self-care), provider-control over health (beliefs in the
efficacy of doctors), chance health outcomes, and general

9

health threat.

Another scale developed by Wallston,

wa11ston, and DeVellis (1978) includes the first three
dimensions of Lau-Ware's (1982) scale.

Finally, Krantz,

Baum, and Wideman (1980) developed the Health Opinion Survey
in order to assess attitudes towards self-directed or
informal treatment.
Clearly, control is a construct given great attention
in the health field.

In stress research, the effects of

providing subjects with information and magnifying
participation and choice have been examined in terms of the
concept of personal control (e.g., Averill, 1973; Langer &
Rodin, 1976).

Magnified participation and choice often lead

to increases in perceived control, since they may provide
subjects with the belief that they can affect their health
outcomes.

Further, information has been thought of as a

form of cognitive control as it may increase the ability to
prepare for aversive events and often results in the
cognitive interpretation of events so that threat is
lessened (Averill, 1973; Seligman, 1975).
Outside.of stress research, internal locus of control
has been linked to knowledge about disease (Seeman & Evans,
1962; B. Wallston, Wallston, Kaplan, & Maides, 1976),
ability to stop smoking (Coan, 1973; James, Woodruff,

&

Werner, 1965; Kaplan & Cowles, 1978; Mlott & Mlott, 1975;
Steffy, Meichenbaum, & Best, 1970; Straits & Sechrest, 1963;
Williams, 1973), ability to lose weight (B. Wallston et al.,

10
1976 ), following medical regimens (Lewis, Morisky,

&

Flynn,

197 s), effective use of birth control (MacDonald, 1970), and
getting preventive inoculations (Dabbs & Kirscht, 1971).
Given the importance of health locus of control (HLC)
beliefs, researchers have begun to address the question of
their origins.

Rotter (1975), discussing general locus of

control, suggests that these beliefs develop from specific
experiences and past reinforcement history.

In other words,

people who have experiences or have been reinforced for
successful control attempts in the past have greater belief
in personal control than those people unsuccessful in their
attempts for control.
Although this origin seems a likely one for
determining peoples' HLC beliefs, I would expect that the
nature of the disease itself would also play a role in such
determination.

The remainder of the introduction will

examine the perceptions among women of breast cancer and BSE
and, further, how different messages might affect such
perceptions.
Hypotheses
Breast cancer is perceived by most women to be an
event not within their control: you can detect it, not
prevent it.

How would loss- and gain-framed information

associated with low- and high-cost behavior affect such
perceptions?

Further, how would such perceptions affect

11
. ?
subsequent be h avior.

women confronted with a loss-framed, low-cost message
are implicitly being told that they do not have control over
getting cancer, but that they do have control over
minimizing its effects.

I would expect women exposed to

such messages to experience reactance, a response to loss of
control that is most likely to occur when existing or
expected control is arbitrarily threatened or withdrawn (J.
w. Brehm, 1966;
1975).

s. s. Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wortman & Brehm,

Reactance will be greater the stronger one's

expectation of freedom, the greater the threat, the greater
the importance of the event, and the stronger the
implication for other freedoms (J. W. Brehm, 1966; Wicklund,
1974).

In the context of Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987)

study, then, women exposed to loss-framed messages may have
performed BSEs to ensure that they have control over the
outcome of breast cancer, as their messages imply.
Certainly, the loss-framed messages threatened greatly their
freedom to live, and having breast cancer would deny them
other freedoms.
How would women in Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987)
study have reacted to the loss-framed message if they had
been told that performing BSE would entail a great amount of
effort and time (a high-cost behavior)?

Although women in

this condition are implicitly told that they can control
(minimize) the effects of breast cancer, such control can

12

only be achieved at a great cost.

I would hypothesize that

helplessness, or the near opposite to reactance, would be
these women's experience.

Instead of responding with

efforts to restore lost freedoms, the women would probably
give in and fail to make any effort to change their
seemingly hopeless situation.

In other words, these women

would probably perceive breast cancer to be an event they
could not control, and as such, would perform BSE less often
(if at all).

Initially, however, these women would probably

feel that they did have control over breast cancer, as
helplessness is often preceded by a short period of
reactance.
Women exposed to gain-framed messages in Meyerowitz
and Chaiken's (1987) study were implicitly told that breast
cancer was an event whose effects they could minimize with
minimum effort.

Possibly, however, women in this condition

were unintentionally given the illusion of control, the
exaggeration of the degree of control one has in situations
that are actually controlled by chance or other
uncontrollable forces (Langer, 1975).

Initially perceiving

breast cancer to be an event determined by external control,
the positive, gain-framed message may have acted to make
women in this condition perceive breast cancer not only as
an event determined by them, but also to perceive their own
involvement in detecting breast cancer as not necessary in
light of their illusion of control.

Women exposed to gain-

13

framed messages requiring high-cost behavior might also
initially gain an illusion of control, but because of the
greater effort needed to prevent breast cancer, I would
expect that these women, in the long run, would perceive
breast cancer to be an event determined by external forces.
This expectation draws on the notion that a high-cost
behavior may serve to elicit a helplessness response.
Immediately after receiving a gain- or loss-framed
message, regardless of cost, I would expect all women,
regardless of condition, to have positive attitudes towards
BSE, albeit for different reasons (See Table 1 for an
outline of the study hypotheses).

Those women in the loss

conditions would have more positive attitudes due to
reactance to their messages.

Those women in the gain

conditions would have more positive attitudes due to the
illusion of control instilled by their messages.

Similarly,

I would expect all women, immediately after the
intervention, to have equally positive and great intentions
of performing BSE.
At a follow-up, I would expect those women in the
loss-framed low-cost message condition to have the most
positive attitudes towards, the greatest intentions of
performing, and to have actually performed BSEs most often,
followed by those women in the gain-framed low-cost message
condition, followed by those women in the gain-framed highcost message condition, followed by those women in the loss-
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framed high-cost message condition.

More concisely, I would

expect an interaction, such that depending on the cost
inherent in a message, the loss and gain frames would yield
different implications for womens' attitudes towards,
intentions of performing, and performance of BSEs.
Finally, with respect to perceived self-efficacy in
performing BSE, I would expect that all women would
initially be equal in their perceived self-efficacy, but for
different reasons, reasons thqt could be elicited by
specific probing of cognitive responses.

Those women in the

loss-framed message conditions might perceive self-efficacy
due to reactance (i.e., in order to combat their seemingly
arbitrary loss of control, they would have to believe that
they are able to be effective in their performance of BSE),
whereas those women in the gain-framed message conditions
might perceive self-efficacy due to their illusion of
control (i.e., because they do not really believe that they
are in danger of getting breast cancer, these women do not
question their ability to perform BSE, and so assume that
they would be effective in performing BSEs).

At a follow-

up, however, I would expect that women in the low-cost
conditions would perceive more self-efficacy than women in
the high-cost conditions, and that women in the loss-framed
low-cost condition would perceive the greatest selfefficacy.

The last expectation assumes that women in the

loss-framed low-cost condition not only view BSE as
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something they are able to control because of its low cost,
but also reflects their actually having performed BSE,
serving to reconfirm their perceived self-efficacy.
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Table 1. Hypotheses at Posttests 1 and 2 as a function of
condition.

OUTLINE OF STUDY HYPOTHESES

condition

Time 1

Time 2

Loss-framed,
Low-cost
(LFLC)

--high reactance

--high
reactance

--low illusion
of control

--low illusion
of control

--low
helplessness

--low
helplessness

--positive attitudes

--most positive
attitudes

--great intentions

--greatest
intentions
--perform BSE
most

--high self-efficacy

--highest selfefficacy
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OUTLINE OF STUDY HYPOTHESES, CONT'D.

condition

Time 1

Time 2

Loss-framed,
High-cost
(LFHC)

--high reactance

--low reactance

--low illusion
of control

--low illusion
of control

--low
helplessness

--high
helplessness

--positive attitudes

--least
positive
attitudes

--great intentions

--least great
intentions
--perform BSE
least often

--high self-efficacy

--lower selfefficacy than
LFLC group
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OUTLINE OF STUDY HYPOTHESES, CONT'D.

condition

Time 1

Time 2

Gain-framed,
Low-cost
(GFLC)

--low reactance

--low reactance

--low
helplessness

--low
helplessness

--high illusion
of control

--high illusion
of control

--positive attitudes

--2nd most
positive
attitudes

--great intentions

--2nd greatest
intentions
--perform BSE
2nd most
often

--high self-efficacy

--2nd highest
self-efficacy
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OUTLINE OF STUDY HYPOTHESES, CONT'D.

condition

Time 1

Time 2

Gain-framed,
High-cost
(GFHC)

--low reactance

--low reactance

--high illusion
of control

--low illusion
of control

--low
helplessness

--high
helplessness

--positive attitudes

--2nd least
positive
attitudes

--great intentions

--2nd least
great
intentions
--perform BSE
2nd least
often

--high self-efficacy

--lower selfefficacy than
LC groups

PILOT TESTS
INTRODUCTION
The pilot tests were conducted for six primary
reasons.

The first concerned the attempt of the researcher

to become alert to and correct any problems that might arise
during the course of the main study.

The second reason was

to find the best means for categorizing the types of
cognitive responses that might occur and to analyze their
potential effect on subsequent attitudes and intentions.
The third reason concerned testing the reliabilities of the
three measures underlying the study's central hypotheses.
Because there were no current measures of reactance,
illusion of control, and helplessness, the experimenter
created her own measures based on the theoretical
underpinnings of those psychological concepts.

The fourth

reason concerned manipulation checks of the four different
messages.

The two questions of primary interest were 1) How

much time and effort are required to perform BSE?, and 2)
What are the benefits (costs) associated with performing
(not performing) BSE?.

The fifth reason was to gain an

understanding of what women's attitudes towards BSE was
20
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prior to the study.

As such, a pretest was administered in

which womens' attitudes towards BSE and other health
practices were ascertained.

Finally, the sixth reason

concerned an attempt to determine whether or not the pilot
test results were in the direction of supporting the study
hypotheses.

Although only one pilot test was planned at the

outset, the second one was conducted as it became clear that
some changes in the first should be made before conducting
the main study.

METHOD
Subjects
Fifty-four Loyola undergraduate women enrolled in
introductory psychology participated in the first pilot test
to fulfill a course requirement.

Thirty Loyola

undergraduate women recruited on campus participated in the
second pilot test.

Each subject was randomly assigned to

one of four conditions, conditions comprising a 2 X 2
design.

Those conditions were as follows: a loss-framed,

low-cost message condition; a loss-framed, high-cost message
condition; a gain-framed, low-cost message condition; and a
gain-framed, high-cost message condition.
Materials
The pamphlet and measures administered to subjects
were of the same format as those administered to subjects in
the main study {See Pilot Tests Procedure section for
measures used).
Procedure
The women in each condition were told that the
22
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materials they received constituted a "health attitudes"
study, and that the study concentrated on breast cancer and
breast self-examination.

Prior to receiving the pamphlets,

subjects received a brief "health attitudes" questionnaire.
Immediately after receiving the pamphlets, subjects
received the following measures administered in a random
order so as to prevent confounding due to one specific order
(See APPENDIX B for actual measures):
1) questions related to the variables accorded
importance as predictors of health behavior within
protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975, 1983;
Rogers

&

Mewborn, 1976) and the related health

belief model (Becker, 1974; Becker
1975).

&

Maiman,

Specifically, those variables are:
A) perceived susceptibility to breast
cancer;
B) perceived severity of breast cancer;
C) beliefs in BSE's efficacy; and
D) perceived self-efficacy in performing
BSE.;

2) measures of belief salience and emotional
responses evoked by the messages, obtained by
asking subjects to write down all thoughts that
occurred to them during their respective messages;
3) recall of the correct procedures for perf,orming
BSEs and of the arguments contained in the
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pamphlets;
4) Wallston et al.

(1978) Multidimensional Health

Locus of Control (MHLC) scale;
5) measures of reactance, helplessness, and
illusion of control;
6) measures of attitudes towards BSE; and
7) measure of intentions of performing BSE.
After completing the measures, subjects were thanked
for participating, and were told that further information
would be sent to them upon request at the completion of the
study.

PILOT TEST RESULTS
The six reasons for conducting a pilot study will be
discussed individually with respect to the results.
Furthermore, because two pilot studies were conducted, the
results will be discussed for the two studies separately.
Unforeseen Problems
The first reason for conducting the pilot tests
concerned an attempt to ascertain that no unforeseen
problems would arise in the main study.
did arise.

Two minor problems

First, some subjects thought that reading the

pamphlet was the only task requested of them.

To make the

subjects aware of the questionnaire following the pamphlet,
the experimenter informed subjects of such.

Specifically,

while handing out the pamphlets, the experimenter told
subjects, "You will be receiving a questionnaire after you
have finished reading this pamphlet."

Besides making

subjects aware of their required tasks, the aim of such
clarification reflected the experimenter's hope that
subjects would process the pamphlet contents in a thoughtful
manner.

Presumably as a result of the experimenter's added

instructions, this problem did not arise during the second
25
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pilot study.
The second problem arose via an inspection of pamphlet
contents.

The experimenter noted that four of the

statements, constant in all of the pamphlets, might lead to
a confounding of conditions.

The first such statement was

on the page entitled, "Basic Facts," and read: "Today,
breast cancer can be found at the earliest possible stage
when chances for cure are nearly 100 percent."

The

experimenter felt that this statement might promote an
illusion of control, and as such, might lower the strength
of the two loss-framed conditions.

The other three

statements were on the page entitled, "How To Do BSE,

11

and

read, in turn, "Women with small breasts will need at least
2 minutes to examine each breast ••• Larger breasts will take
longer ••• Choose the method easiest for you."

The

experimenter felt that these statements may confuse subjects
as to the actual time and effort involved in doing BSE,
especially those subjects in the two "high-cost" conditions.
Due to these possible confounds, the experimenter replaced
the first statement with the following, "The American Cancer
Society recommends that all women perform breast self-exams
(BSEs).

11

pamphlet.

The last three statements were erased from the
The second pilot test employed the revised

pamphlet.
Cognitive Response Categorization/Analysis
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The second reason for conducting the pilot tests was
to find the best means for categorizing the types of
cognitive responses that occurred and to analyze their
potential effect on attitudes and intentions.

Two ways of

categorizing the cognitive responses were decided on by
examining the responses of subjects in the first pilot
study.

The first concerned the favorability of the

responses and the categories were, "favorable,"
"unfavorable," and "neutral."

The second concerned the

source of the responses and the categories were, "message,"
"issue," and "message and issue."

All of the above

categories encompassed fully the types of cognitive
responses made by subjects and were used again for the
second pilot test

results.

Due to the possible confounding

of conditions in the first pilot test (N=54) and to the
small number of subjects {N=30) in the second pilot test,
the experimenter did not categorize the cognitive responses
with respect to the study hypotheses, i.e., in terms of
reactance, helplessness, and illusion of control.

such

categorization was done during the main study.
In an attempt to ascertain what, if any, relationships
existed between the cognitive responses and subsequent
attitudes and intentions, two chi-square analyses and two
one-way ANOVAS were performed.

The first chi-square

examined the effects of the frame and cost manipulations on
the favorability of cognitive responses, those responses
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having been coded categorically.

Cognitive responses were

coded as favorable, unfavorable, or neutral.

The number of

people in the two pilot studies who had favorable,
unfavorable, or neutral responses are shown in Appendix A,
Table

9.

Neither analyzing the two pilot tests' data

separately nor jointly yielded significant differences among
the conditions.

It appears as though the frame and cost

manipulations had no effect on the favorability of cognitive
responses.
The second chi-square examined the effects of the
frame and cost manipulations on the source of cognitive
responses, those responses having been coded categorically.
Cognitive responses were coded as message, issue, or message
and issue.

The number of people in the two pilot tests who

gave "message," "issue," or "message and issue" responses
are shown in Appendix A, Table 10.

Neither analyzing the

two pilot tests' data separately nor jointly yielded
significant differences among the conditions.

It appears as

though the frame and cost manipulations had no effect on the
source of cognitive responses.
The first ANOVA examined the effects of the
favorability and source of cognitive responses on BSE
attitudes.

Combining the data from the two pilot tests,

those subjects with favorable cognitive responses were
marginally significantly more likely to have more positive
attitudes than were those subjects with unfavorable or
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neutral cognitive responses [(main effect, Favorability:
F=2.61,

(2,69), p5.08l); See mean scores in Appendix A,

Table 11].

This exploratory analysis, then, suggests that

favorable BSE cognitive responses may be capable of
predicting favorable BSE attitudes.
The second ANOVA examined the effects of the
favorability and source of cognitive responses on BSE
intentions.

There was no significant difference or trend

among conditions, combining data for the two pilot tests
[(2-way interaction: F=.961,

(2,69), p5.387); see Appendix A

Table 12 for mean scores], indicating that favorability and
source of cognitive responses had no effect on BSE
intentions.

There were few significant differences when

examining the effects of cognitive responses, and even those
differences should be interpreted with caution due to the
unreliability of those differences across pretests, the
marginality of some of the significant differences, and the
small number of subjects in the second pilot test
especially.
Accuracy of Measures
The third reason for conducting the pilot tests was to
test the reliabilities of the measures, especially those of
reactance, illusion of control, and helplessness.

One of

the BSE efficacy items was not significantly related to the
other two (r=-.03, P=.43), and hence was dropped for the
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second pilot test.

The two self-efficacy items were

significantly related (r=.41, P=.001) to each other.

The

subscales of the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control
scale were reliable ("Internal" subscale (alpha=.73);
"Powerful Others" subscale (alpha=.79); and "Chance"
subscale (alpha=.70)).

The BSE Attitudes index was reliable

at the first pilot test (alpha=.94).

Four items were added

to the index at the second pilot test and items were revised
to allow for more extreme attitudes as almost all subjects
during the first pilot test expressed highly positive
attitudes.

The revised BSE Attitudes index, used at the

second pilot test, was reliable (alpha=.92).

One item was

not related highly to the other items, however (corrected
item-total correlation=.17), and so was not included in the
main study.

The first reactance index (there are two

reactance indices, the first measuring threatened freedoms
and the second measuring available options) was reliable at
the first pilot test (alpha=.75) and at the second pilot
test (alpha=.88).

The second reactance index was also

reliable at the first pilot test (alpha=.72).

Because the

filler items seemed to promote a response bias towards the
upper end of the scale, however, they were deleted from the
questionnaire at the second pilot test.

The revised second

reactance index was reliable at the second pilot test
(alpha=.74).

At the first pilot test, the reliability of

the illusion of control index increased with the inclusion
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of the filler items (alpha=.82).

Due to this inappropriate

increase in reliability, the filler items were made more
obviously true at the second pilot test.

At the second

pilot test, the reliability of the illusion of control index
was not high with the fillers (alpha=.47) but without the
fillers, the reliability increased (alpha=.61).
Manipulation Checks
The fourth reason for conducting the pilot tests was
to perform manipulation checks on the four different
messages.

Manipulation checks were done only at the first

pilot test as the manipulations, checked by subjects'
pamphlet argument recall, were successful.

Subjects in the

gain-framed conditions reported arguments in gain language
(i.e., stressed the positive consequences associated with
performing BSE) significantly more often than did subjects
in the loss-framed conditions [(main effect, Frame: F=24.07,
(1,50), p~.0001); see Appendix A, Table 13 for mean scores].
There was, however, a main effect for cost, such that
subjects in the low-cost conditions reported arguments in
gain language significantly more often than did subjects in
the high-cost conditions (main effect, Cost: F=4.81,

(1,50),

p~.030), giving rise to the possibility that the higher
reporting of gain-framed arguments by subjects in gainframed conditions might be confounded by the also higher
reporting of gain-framed arguments by subjects in low-cost
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conditions.

Subjects in the loss-framed conditions reported

arguments in loss language (i.e., stressed the negative
consequences associated with not performing BSE)
significantly more often than did subjects in the gainframed conditions [(main effect, Frame: F=14.35,

(1,50),

p5.000l); see Appendix A, Table 14 for mean scores].

Again,

however, there was a main effect for cost, such that
subjects in the high-cost conditions reported arguments in
loss language significantly more often than did subjects in
the low-cost conditions (main effect, Cost: F=4.09,

(1,50),

p5.048), giving rise to the possibility that the higher
reporting of loss-framed arguments by subjects in lossframed conditions might be confounded by the also higher
reporting of loss-framed arguments by subjects in high-cost
conditions.

Finally, subjects in the low-cost conditions

reported arguments in terms of low-cost (with respect to
time and effort involved in performing BSE) significantly
more often than did subjects in the high-cost conditions
[(F=2.72,

(1,50), p5.105); See Appendix A, Table 15 for mean

scores].

The marginal significance of this main effect was

due to a two-way interaction, subjects in the loss-framed,
low-cost condition being most likely to report arguments in
terms of low cost (F=5.309,

(1,50), p5.025).

Virtually no

subjects reported arguments in terms of high cost, so the
experimenter added one "cost" argument to pamphlets to be
used in the main study so as to help ensure that the cost
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manipulation would be more explicitly effective.
Prior Attitudes
The fifth reason for conducting the pilot tests was to
ascertain what women's attitudes towards BSE were prior to
the experiment.

The two questions of interest were 1) "How

enjoyable is it to perform BSE?" (response options ranging
from

11

1 11 to

11

7,"

11

1 11 being "unenjoyable" and

11

7 11 being

"enjoyable") and 2) "How beneficial is it to perform BSE?"
(response options ranging from
"harmful" and

11

11

1 11 to

7 11 being "beneficial").

11

7,"

11

1 11 being

The experimenter

believed that although most women would perceive BSE to be a
beneficial act, most women would probably simultaneously
perceive BSE to be an either neutral or slightly unenjoyable
act.

In fact, most women did perceive BSE to be beneficial

(X=6.60, N=54) but not very enjoyable (X=3.46, N=54).

Such

prior attitudes were important to ascertain with respect to
the balance attempted in the manipulation.

That is to say,

in constructing the manipulation, the assumption was made
that most women perceived BSE to be slightly unenjoyable.
Another reason for assessing women's prior attitudes towards
BSE was to inspect whether or not such attitudes would have
an effect on post-experimental attitudes.

Two ANCOVAS were

performed on post-experimental attitudes using prior
attitudes as covariates.

The prior attitudes were treated

independently as the "beneficiality" and "enjoyability"
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pretest attitude scores were not significantly related to
each other (r=.051, p=.356).

The covariates had no effect

on the significance of post-experimental attitudes, lending
support to the conclusion that prior attitudes had no effect
on post-experimental attitudes towards BSE.

Because the

above results with respect to prior attitudes were
conclusive, this measure was not used again at the second
pilot test.
Study Hypotheses
The sixth reason for conducting the pilot tests was to
observe whether or not the results were in the direction of
supporting the study hypotheses.

Of special import were the

post-experimental attitudes and intentions across the four
experimental conditions.

In the first pilot study, there

was no significant difference among women in the four
experimental conditions with respect to attitudes [(two-way
interaction: F=.634,
16 for

mean scores].

(1,50), P=.430); see Appendix A, Table
Also in the first pilot test, there

was a main effect of cost on women's intentions of
performing BSE, those women in the low-cost conditions
having greater intentions of performing BSE than women in
the high-cost conditions [(main effect, Cost: F=4.27,
(1,50), P=.044); see Appendix A, Table 17 for mean scores].
Because it was believed that the manipulation might have
been confounded (as discussed earlier) by other pamphlet
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contents, changes were made in the pamphlets so as to elicit
a greater difference in attitudes and intentions across
conditions.

In the second pilot test, there was a

marginally significant difference among women across
conditions with respect to attitudes, women in the lossframed conditions holding more positive attitudes towards
BSE than women in the gain-framed conditions [(main effect,
Frame: F=J.18,

(1,26), P=.086); see Appendix A, Table 18 for

mean scores).

Also in the second pilot test, however, there

was no significant difference among women in the four
conditions with respect to intentions [(two-way interaction:
F=.297,

(1,26), P=.590); see Appendix A, Table 19 for the

mean scores).
Combining the data from the two pilot tests, there was
no significant difference among women across conditions with
respect to attitudes [(two-way interaction: F=.48,

(1,80),

p~.489; see Appendix A, Table 20 for mean scores).

This

result should be interpreted with great caution as the
Attitude index items used for analysis and the study
materials in general were not identical for the two pilot
tests.

Also in combining the data from the two pilot tests,

there was no significant difference among women across
conditions with respect to intentions [(two-way interaction:
F=.215,
scores).

(1,80), p~.644); see Appendix A, Table 21 for mean
Again, this result should be interpreted with

caution as the study materials were not identical for the
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two pilot tests.
In order to make the manipulations stronger, two
ngain-loss frame" arguments and one "low-high cost" argument
were added to the pamphlet in the main study.

Although the

second pilot test yielded results only partially supportive
of the study hypotheses in terms of expected attitudes and
intentions, it should be noted that differences in attitudes
and intentions across conditions were expected not at the
immediate posttest, but mainly at a follow-up.

MAIN STUDY
INTRODUCTION

Having learned from the two pilot tests, the
experimenter felt ready to conduct the main study.

The main

study was very similar to the pilot tests in intent and in
procedure.
METHOD

Subjects
One hundred-twenty Loyola undergraduate women, some
enrolled in introductory psychology and some recruited on
campus, participated in the study.

Each subject was

randomly assigned to one of four conditions, comprising a 2
X 2 design.

The conditions were as follows: a loss-framed,

low-cost message condition; a loss-framed, high-cost message
condition; a gain-framed, low-cost message condition; and a
gain-framed, high-cost message condition.
Materials

The pamphlets administered to subjects were similar to
37
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those distributed by the American Cancer Society (ACS) and
the National Cancer Institute (NCI).

Following the example

of Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987) study, pages 1, 3, and 4
were identical for subjects in the four pamphlet conditions.
page 1, titled, "Basic Facts," included the ACS's
recommendation that all women perform monthly BSEs and
information about the prevalence of breast cancer.

Pages 3

and 4 presented information describing when and how to do
BSE.
Page 2 differed for the four pamphlet conditions.

For

gain- and loss-frame subjects, this page contained six
arguments supporting the importance of performing BSE.
Although factually equivalent, these arguments were framed
in terms of either the positive consequences of doing BSE
(gain conditions) or the negative consequences of not doing
BSE (loss conditions).

For low- and high-cost subjects,

this page contained four additional statements indicating
the amount of effort and time needed to perform BSE.
the low-cost subjects, these statements stressed

For

the

minimal time and effort required of women in performing BSE.
For the high-cost subjects, these statements stressed a
somewhat greater amount of time and effort required by women
than was stressed for the low-cost subjects.
C for "Page 2" for the different conditions).

(See Appendix
The pamphlet

arguments were presented in the same order for all subjects.
Measures were administered at two times after the
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pamphlets were administered.
Procedure
women in each condition were told that the materials
they received constituted a "health attitudes" study, and
that the study was meant to concentrate on breast cancer and
breast self-examination.
Prior to receiving the pamphlets, subjects received a
pretest embedded with questions related to their attitudes
towards performing BSEs (See APPENDIX B for study measures).
Immediately after receiving the pamphlets and at a threemonth follow-up, subjects in the four pamphlet conditions
received the study measures listed in the Pilot Tests
Procedure section.

In addition to those measures, at a

follow-up, subjects were asked about their performance of
BSE.

It should be noted that although the substantive

content of the questionnaires received by subjects at the
two posttests was the same, there were subtle differences in
wording due to the nature of the posttests (the first
required self-administered interviews and the second
required telephone interviews).
The primary intent of the second measure (see Pilot
Tests Procedure section), the cognitive responses, was to
investigate the influence of cognitive responses as a
mediating variable on subjects' subsequent attitudes,
intentions, and behaviors.

That is, did the condition to
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which one was assigned determine in part a subject's
cognitive responses, and did those responses determine in
part a subject's subsequent attitudes, intentions, and
behaviors?

A secondary intent of this measure's use was to

note whether or not subjects• responses provided support for
the experimenter's hypotheses.

For example, at the first

posttest, a response similar to "I've got too many things to
live for," might have been a sign of reactance, as a
response similar to "I have nothing to worry about," might
have been a sign of an illusion of control.

At follow-up, a

response similar to" I can't do anything to offset breast
cancer" might have been a sign of helplessness.
After the subjects completed the questionnaires, they
were thanked for taking part in the study and were
encouraged to ask any questions they might have.

Further,

the subjects were told that they would be given more
information about the study after the follow-up.
At the follow-up, subjects were contacted by telephone
to ensure their convenience.

To maximize response rate,

subjects were told at the first posttest that they would be
called in about eight weeks.

The response rate at the

follow-up was 88% (98/112) and the dropout rate was not
significantly different across conditions (4-LFLC; 2-GFLC;
4-LFHC; and 4-GFHC).

The follow-up included the exact

measures included at the first posttest.
After completing the follow-up, subjects were
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debriefed.

They were told, specifically, that the study's

purpose was to assess the effects of gain- vs. loss-framed
and low-vs. high-cost messages in the context of BSEs in
particular, and in the context of health detection measures
in general.

Also, the subjects were told that the results

of the study would be sent to them upon request.
Furthermore, they were told that if they had any questions
or concerns, they should feel free to contact the researcher
at any time.

Finally, the subjects were greatly thanked for

their contribution to the study in particular and to social
science in general.

MAIN STUDY RESULTS

Manipulation Checks
At the first and second posttests, the manipulations,
as checked by subjects' pamphlet argument recall, were
successful.

Furthermore, there was no evidence of potential

confounds as there was at the pilot tests.

At the first and

second posttests, subjects in the gain-framed

conditions

reported arguments in gain language statistically
significantly more often than did subjects in the lossframed conditions ((posttest 1 main effect: F=46.229,
(1,101), p~.0001); (posttest 2 main effect: F=40.385,
(1,90), p~.0001); see Appendix A, Table 22 for mean scores
at both posttests].

Likewise, subjects in the loss-framed

conditions reported arguments in loss language significantly
more often than did subjects in the gain-framed conditions
[(posttest 1 main effect: F=31.360,
(posttest 2 main effect: F=77.614,

(1,101), p~.0001);
(1,90), p~.0001); see

Appendix A, Table 23 for mean scores at both posttests].
Finally, subjects in the low-cost conditions reported
arguments in terms of low cost significantly more often than
did subjects in the high-cost conditions at the first
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posttest but not at the second posttest [(posttest 1 main
effect: F=7.554,
F=l.000,

(1,101), p5.007); (posttest 2 main effect:

(1,90), p5.320); see Table 24 for mean scores at

both posttestsJ.

As in the first pilot study, no subjects

reported arguments in terms of high cost at the first or
second posttests.

Noted should be the fact that although

there was very little incorrect recall (of arguments not
heard), the correct recall was somewhat low (gain-framed,
posttest 1: 1.9/6; gain-framed, posttest 2: 1.1/6; lossframed, posttest 1: .81/6; loss-framed, posttest 2: .74/6;
low-cost, posttest 1: .25/6; and low-cost, posttest 2:
.02/6).

Noted also should be the fact that although only

one person coded the recall of pamphlet arguments, the
coding was probably not biased given its straightforwardness
and the blindness of the coder with respect to subject
conditions.
Cognitive Responses
As done in the pilot tests, an attempt was made at
both posttests to determine what, if any, relationships
existed between the cognitive responses and subsequent
attitudes and intentions via two chi-squares and two one-way
ANOVAs.

The first chi-square examined the effects of frame

and cost manipulations on the favorability of cognitive
responses.

The number of people at each posttest who had

favorable, unfavorable, or neutral responses are shown in
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Appendix A, Table 25.

Combining the data from both

posttests, 8% of the women had favorable cognitive
responses, 6% had unfavorable cognitive responses, and 86%
had neutral cognitive responses.

From the nonsignificance

of the chi-square, it is evident that the manipulations had
no effect on the favorability of cognitive responses.

In

fact, the majority of women reported neutral cognitive
responses.
The second chi-square examined the effects of the
frame and cost manipulations on the source of cognitive
responses.

The number of people at each posttest who gave

"message," "issue," or

"message and issue" responses are

shown in Appendix A, Table 26.

Again, combining the data

from both posttests, 17% of the women gave "message"
cognitive responses, 70% gave "issue" cognitive responses,
and 13% gave "message and issue" cognitive responses.

From

the nonsignificance of the chi-square, it is evident that
the manipulations had no effect on the source of cognitive
responses.

In fact, the majority of women gave "issue"

cognitive responses.
The first ANOVA examined the effects of the
favorability and source of cognitive responses on BSE
attitudes.

There was no significant difference at either

posttest across conditions ((posttest 1 two-way interaction:
F=l.727,

(3,87), p~.167); (posttest 2 two-way interaction:

F=l.816,

(3,80), p~.151); see Appendix A, Table 27 for mean
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scores at both posttests], indicating that favorability and
source of cognitive responses had no effect on BSE
attitudes.

These results should be interpreted with caution

as there were very small numbers of people who gave
favorable and unfavorable responses.
The second ANOVA examined the effects of the
favorability and source of cognitive responses on BSE
intentions.

There was no significant difference at either

posttest across conditions [(posttest 1 two-way interaction:
F=.938,
F=l.023,

(3,92), p5.426); (posttest 2 two-way interaction:
(3,80), p5.387); see Appendix A, Table 28 for mean

scores at both posttests], indicating that favorability and
source had no effect on BSE intentions.

Again, these

results should be interpreted with caution as there were
very small numbers of people who gave favorable and
unfavorable responses.
Attitudes
At the first posttest, there was no statistically
significant difference across the four conditions with
respect to women's attitudes towards performing breast selfexams [(two-way interaction: F=l.58,

(1, 103), p5.212); see

Table 2 for mean scores at both posttests].

The mean

attitude score was, however, relatively high as expected
(range from 71.73 (5.12/7 per attitude item) for the gainframed, low-cost condition to 76.75 (5.46/7 per attitude
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item) for the loss-framed, low-cost condition out of a
possible "98.00" total).

At the second posttest, there was

an unexpected statistically significant main effect
difference (F=7.086,

(1,91) p~.009) such that the high-cost

conditions had more favorable attitudes towards performing
breast self-exams than did the low-cost conditions, the
expectation being that the low-cost conditions, and
especially the loss-framed, low-cost condition, would have
the most positive attitudes.

There also evinced a slight

"sleeper effect" for all but the loss-framed, low-cost
condition, this effect being especially present for the
loss-framed, high-cost condition, such that women in these
conditions had more positive attitudes at the second
posttest than they had at the first posttest.

Table 2. Mean scores of BSE attitudes as a function of
condition, using data from Posttests 1 and 2.
POSTTEST 1
LOWCOST

HIGHCOST

LOSSFRAME

76.75
N=28

75.00
N=26

GAINFRAME

71. 73
N=26

75.70
N=27

74.33
N=54

75.36
N=53

POSTTEST 2
LOWCOST

HIGHCOST

75.91
N=54

75.04
N=24

83.23
N=22

78.96
N=46

73.75
N=53

73.84
N=25

78.08
N=24

75.92
N=49

74.43
N=49

80.54
N=46
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Intentions
At the first posttest, there was no statistically
significant difference across the four conditions with
respect to women's intentions of performing breast selfexams in the future [(2-way interaction: F=.084,

(1,108),

p5.775); see Table 3 for mean scores at both posttests].
The mean intention score was, however, relatively high as
expected (range from 5.57/7 for the loss-framed, high-cost
condition to 5.82/7 for the gain-framed, high-cost
condition).

At the second posttest, the main effect for the

Frame condition was statistically significant (F=4.542,
p5.04) and the main effect for the Cost condition was
marginally statistically significant (F=2.844, p5.10), such
that the gain-framed conditions and the high-cost conditions
had greater intentions of performing BSEs than did the lossframed conditions and the low-cost conditions, respectively.
Both of these findings were contrary to expectations, those
being that the low-cost conditions and especially the lossframed, low-cost condition would have the greatest
intentions of performing BSEs.

Also, there again evinced a

slight "sleeper effect" for all but the loss-framed, lowcost condition, such that women in those three conditions
had greater intentions of performing BSEs at the second
posttest.
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Table 3. Mean scores of BSE intentions as a function of
condition, using data from Posttests 1 and 2.
POSTTEST 1
LOWCOST

HIGHCOST

LOSS-

5.64

5.57

FRAME

N=28

GAINFRAME

POSTTEST 2

LOWCOST

HIGHCOST

5.61

5.29

5.86

5.56

N=28

N=56

N=24

N=22

N=46

5.75
N=28

5.82
N=28

5.79
N=56

5.96
N=25

6.21
N=24

6.08
N=49

5.70
N=56

5.70
N=56

5.63
N=49

6.04
N=46

In an attempt to better understand the relationship
between attitudes and intentions at both posttests and also
to give closer examination to two of the main variables in
the study, cross-lagged correlations were conducted.

All of

the correlations were greater than .30 and all were
significant (See Table 4 below for correlations).

The

highest correlations were between Posttest 1 and Posttest 2
attitudes and between Posttest 1 and Posttest 2 intentions,
possibly signifying the strong reliabilities of the
attitudes and intentions measures.

Also, the correlation

between attitudes and intentions was greater at Posttest 2
than it was at Posttest 1, although the increase is probably
not a significant one.

Finally, the correlation between

Posttest 1 attitudes and Posttest 2 intentions was slightly
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but not significantly greater than the correlation between
posttest 1 intentions and Posttest 2 attitudes, such that no
conclusions can be drawn with respect to one measure's
scores being causally related to the other measure's scores.

Table 4. Cross-lagged correlations of Posttest 1 and
Posttest 2 attitudes and intentions.
Posttest 2

Posttest 1

attitudes -1
.390

I

.597
(90) -- -- attitudes
I

I
II

(9o)

I

.422

.540

(107)

(95)

I
II

I
II

I

I

. 304
(94)

intentions --

.589
(94)

-- -- intentions

Note: All r's: p~.0001.

Self-efficacy
At the first posttest, there was no statistically
significant difference across the four conditions with
respect to self-efficacy in performing breast self-exams
[(two-way interaction: F=.001,

(1,106), p~.980); see

Appendix A, Table 29 for mean scores at both posttests].
The mean self-efficacy score was, however, relatively high
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as expected (range from 10.29 (5.14/7 per self-efficacy
item) for the loss-framed, low-cost condition to 11.37
(5.68/7 per self-efficacy item) for the gain-framed, highcost condition out of a possible "14.00" total).

At the

second posttest, there was a statistically significant main
effect difference (F=7.115,

(1,91), p~.009) such that the

high-cost conditions reported a greater sense of selfefficacy than did the low-cost conditions.

This finding was

contrary to the expectation that the low-cost conditions and
especially the loss-framed, low-cost group would have the
highest perceived self-efficacy.

Also noteworthy is the

finding that for all conditions, the self-efficacy scores
were higher at the second posttest than they were at the
first posttest.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES

Reactance
Women in the loss-framed conditions were expected to
experience reactance at the time of the first posttest and
women in the loss-framed, low-cost condition were expected
to continue to experience reactance at the second posttest.
Four measures of reactance will be discussed in turn to
determine whether or not these expectations were met.
First, subjects experiencing reactance should have
given statistically significantly more cognitive responses
reflecting anger and hostility than subjects not
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experiencing reactance.

Virtually no one, however, at

either posttest, reported such responses.
Second, subjects experiencing reactance should have
had statistically significantly higher scores on the MHLC
Internal subscale than subjects not experiencing reactance.
At the first posttest, however, there was no statistically
significant difference between the gain- and loss-framed
conditions with respect to these scores [(Frame main effect:
F=.815,

(1,107), p~.369); see Appendix A, Table 30 for mean

scores at both posttests] and at the second posttest, too,
there was no statistically significant difference between
the loss-framed, low-cost condition and the other conditions
with respect to these scores (two-way interaction: F=.777,
(1,91), p~.38).
Third, subjects experiencing reactance should have had
statistically significantly lower scores on the "Reactance"
index, Part A (See Appendix B) than subjects not
experiencing reactance.

At the first posttest, however,

there was no statistically significant difference between
the gain- and loss-framed conditions with respect to these
scores [(Frame main effect: F=.713,

(1,103), p~.401); see

Appendix A, Table 31 for mean scores at both posttests] and
at the second posttest, there was no statistically
significant difference between the loss-framed, low-cost
condition and the other conditions (two-way interaction:
F= . 2 6 2 ,

( 1 , 91) , p~. 610) .
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Fourth, subjects experiencing reactance should have
had statistically significantly higher scores on the
"Reactance" index, Part B (See Appendix B) than subjects not
experiencing reactance.

At the first posttest, however,

there was no statistically significant difference between
the gain- and loss-framed conditions with respect to these
scores [(Frame main-effect: F=.096,

(1,105), p~.758); see

Appendix A, Table 32 for mean scores at both posttests] and
at the second posttest, there was no statistically
significant difference between the loss-framed, low-cost
condition and the other conditions (two-way interaction:
F=l.787,

(1,91), p~.185).

Following these individual analyses, an overall
analysis was performed on the three relevant measures of
reactance combined.

After reverse-scoring the items on the

"Reactance" index, Part A and transforming the MHLC Internal
scores, the "Reactance" index, Part A scores, and the
"Reactance" index, Part B scores to z-scores, correlations
among the three measures were computed for both posttests
(See Appendix A, Table 33).

Not having full justification

for combining these three measures into one total
"Reactance" score based on their intercorrelations, no such
score was computed and no further analyses were done with
respect to the Reactance measures.
Illusion of Control
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Women in the gain-framed conditions were expected to
experience an illusion of control at the time of the first
posttest and women in the gain-framed, low-cost condition
were expected to continue to experience an illusion of
control at the second posttest.

Four measures of an

illusion of control will be discussed in turn to determine
whether or not these

expectations were met.

First, subjects experiencing an illusion of control
should have given statistically significantly more cognitive
responses reflecting this process than subjects not
experiencing an illusion of control.

Virtually no one,

however, at either posttest, reported such responses.
Second, subjects experiencing an illusion of control
should have had statistically significantly lower scores on
the item reflecting breast cancer susceptibility than
subjects not experiencing an illusion of control.

At the

first posttest, however, there was no statistically
significant difference between the gain- and loss-framed
conditions with respect to these scores [(Frame main-effect:
F=l.038,

(1,107), p5.310); see Appendix A, Table 34 for mean

scores at both posttests] and at the second posttest, there
was no statistically significant difference between the
gain-framed, low-cost condition and the other conditions
(two-way interaction: F=.677,

(1,91), p5.413).

Third, subjects experiencing an illusion of control
should have had statistically significantly higher scores on
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the items reflecting BSE efficacy than subjects not
experiencing an illusion of control.

At the first posttest,

however, there was no statistically significant difference
between the gain- and loss-framed conditions with respect to
these scores [(Frame main-effect: F=.427,

(1,108), p5.515);

see Appendix A, Table 35 for mean scores at both posttests]
and at the second posttest, there was no statistically
significant difference between the gain-framed, low-cost
condition and the other conditions (two-way interaction:
F=.620,

(1,91), p5.433).

Fourth, subjects experiencing an illusion of control
should have had statistically significantly higher scores on
the "Illusion of Control" index than subjects not
experiencing an illusion of control.

At the first posttest,

however, there was no statistically significant difference
between the gain- and loss-framed conditions with respect to
these scores [(Frame main-effect: F=.659,

(l,96), p5.419);

see Appendix A, Table 36 for mean scores at both posttests].
At the second posttest, there was a statistically
significant Cost main effect difference (F=4.670,

(1,89),

p5.033), such that women in the low-cost conditions had
scores exhibiting a greater degree of an illusion of control
than did women in the high-cost conditions.

The

expectation, however, was that only women in the gainframed, low-cost condition would have higher scores than
women in other conditions on this index.
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Following these individual analyses, an overall
analysis was performed on the three relevant measures of
illusion of control. After reverse-scoring the item
reflecting breast cancer susceptibility and transforming
that item, the items reflecting breast self-exam efficacy,
and the Illusion of Control index scores to z-scores,
correlations among the three measures were computed for both
posttests (See Appendix A, Table 37).

Not having full

justification for combining these three measures into one
total "Illusion of Control" score based on their
intercorrelations, no such score was computed and no further
analyses were done with respect to the Illusion of Control
measures.

As in the Reactance analyses, no analysis lent

support to the expectation that subjects in the gain-framed
conditions would experience a greater degree of illusion of
control at the first posttest or that subjects in the gainframed, low-cost conditions would experience a greater
degree of illusion of control than subjects in the other
conditions at the second posttest.
Helplessness
Women in the high-cost conditions were expected to
experience helplessness at the time of the second posttest.
Four measures of helplessness will be discussed in turn to
determine whether or not these expectations were met.
First, subjects experiencing helplessness should have
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given statistically significantly more cognitive responses
reflecting discouragement and loss of hope than subjects not
experiencing helplessness.

Virtually no one, however,

reported such responses.
Second, subjects experiencing helplessness should have
had statistically significantly lower scores on the MHLC
Internal subscale than subjects not experiencing
helplessness.

At the second posttest, however, there was no

statistically significant difference between the high- and
low-cost conditions with respect to these scores [(Cost main
effect: F=.141,

(1,91), p~.708); see Appendix A, Table 30

for mean scores].
Third, subjects experiencing helplessness should have
had statistically significantly higher scores on the
"Reactance" index, Part A than subjects not experiencing
helplessness.

At the second posttest, however, there was no

statistically significant difference between the high- and
low-cost conditions with respect to these scores [(Cost main
effect: F=l.673,

(1,91), p~.199); see Appendix A, Table 31

for mean scores].
Fourth, subjects experiencing helplessness should have
had statistically significantly lower scores on the
"Reactance" index, Part B than subjects not experiencing
helplessness.

At the second posttest, however, there was no

statistically significant difference between the high- and
low-cost conditions with respect to these scores [(Cost main
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effect: F=.104,

(1,91), p5.747); see Appendix A, Table 32

for mean scores).
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Negativity Bias
Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) claim to have ruled out
the effect of a "negativity bias" - the finding that
negative information exerts a greater judgmental impact than
objectively equivalent positive information (e.g., Anderson,
1965) - on their results.

To test a potential effect of a

negativity bias on the present results, at-test was
performed to determine if women in the loss-framed
conditions recalled loss-framed arguments statistically
significantly more often than women in the gain-framed
conditions recalled gain-framed arguments.

There was an

opposite statistically significant difference at the first
posttest [(t=-4.828,

(103), p5.005,); see Appendix A, Table

38 for mean scores at both posttests) and at the second
posttest (t=-2.938,

(92), p5.005), such that women in gain-

framed conditions reported arguments in gain-framed language
more frequently than women in loss-framed conditions
reported loss-framed arguments, a result opposite of what
the negativity bias would predict.

Noted, however, should

be the idea that recall does not necessarily have an impact
on·attitudes.
Fearful Content
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Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) also claim to have ruled
out the notion that their negative message was confounded by
its fearful content, as high-fear appeals have generally
been found to be more persuasive than low-fear appeals
(e.g., Higbee, 1969).

To test this potential confounding in

the present study, subjects' cognitive responses were coded
for reflections of fear.

At the first posttest, there was

no statistically significant difference between the gainand loss-framed conditions with respect to the number of
times subjects mentioned being scared by their respective
messages [(main effect, Frame: F=.541,

(1,99), p5.464); see

Appendix A, Table 39 for mean scores at both posttests],
seeming to rule out the confounding of negative content and
fear.

There was, however, a marginally significant

difference between the low- and high-cost conditions, those
women in the low-cost conditions reporting greater fear than
those women in the high-cost conditions (F=3.392,
p5.068).

(1,99),

At the second posttest also, there was no

statistically significant difference between the gain- and
loss-framed conditions with respect to the number of times
subjects mentioned being scared by their respective messages
(main effect, Frame: F=2.061,

(1,91), p5.l60).

The main

effect of the Cost manipulation, found at the first
posttest, was not replicated.

To be stressed with respect

to these analyses should be the very small number of times
subjects mentioned being scared.
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Protection Motivation Theory Variables
Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) attempted to rule .out
the possibility that between the gain- and loss-framed
conditions, women's attitudes and behaviors may have been
affected via the influence of one or more variables given
importance as predictors of health behavior within
protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975, 1983; Rogers &
Mewborn, 1976).

Those variables are perceived severity (of

breast cancer), perceived susceptibility (to breast cancer),
perceived efficacy (of BSE), and perceived self-efficacy (in
performing BSE).

As the last was found to differentiate

between women in the gain- and loss-framed conditions in
Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987) study, it was found to
differentiate between women in the low- and high-cost
conditions at the second posttest of this study [(F=7.115,
(1,91), p5.009); see Table 29, Posttest 2 results] such that
women in the high-cost conditions reported a greater sense
of self-efficacy with respect to performing BSEs than did
women in the low-cost conditions.

All of the other

protection motivation theory variables failed to
differentiate among the conditions in this study
[((perceived severity of breast cancer: posttest 1 two-way
interaction: F=.009,

(1,106), p5.923; posttest 2 two-way

interaction: F=.337,

(1,91), p5.563), see Table 40 for mean

scores at both posttests); ((perceived susceptibility to
breast cancer: posttest 1 two-way interaction: F=.533,
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(1,107), p~.467; posttest 2 two-way interaction: F=.677,
(1,91), p~.410), see Table 34 for mean scores at both
posttests); ((perceived efficacy of BSE: posttest 1 two-way
interaction: F=.230,

(1,108), p=.633; posttest 2 two-way

interaction: F=.620,

(1,91), p~.430), see Table 35 for mean

scores at both posttests); and ((perceived self-efficacy:
posttest 1 two-way interaction: F=.001,

(1,91), p~.980;

posttest 2 two-way interaction: F=.428,

(1,91), p~.515), see

Table 29 for mean scores at both posttests)].
BSE Performance
Performance of BSEs was determined by subjects'
answers to three questions: 1) How many times, since you
read the pamphlet on breast self-exams, did you perform a
breast self-exam?; 2) How careful were you each time you
performed a breast self-exam?; and 3) How thorough were you
each time you performed a breast self-exam?.

The last two

questions had response options that ranged from
at all (careful)
(thorough)."

(thorough)" to

11

11

1, 11 or "not

5," or "extremely (careful)

A "total" performance score was calculated by

weighting the number of times a subject performed a breast
self-exam by

11

2 11 and adding that number to the numbers

assigned to the "careful" and "thorough" questions.

There

was a marginally statistically significant two-way
interaction (F=3.028,

(1,91), p~.084; see Table 5 for mean

scores) and a marginally statistically significant main
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effect difference for the Cost condition (F=3.126,

(1,91),

p5.080) such that women in the high-cost conditions had
higher scores on the BSE Performance index than did women in
the low-cost conditions, and women in the high-cost, lossframed condition had the highest scores on the index.

The

expectation that women in the loss-framed, low-cost
condition would have the highest BSE Performance index
scores was not met; in fact, women in this condition had the
lowest scores.
Table 5. Mean scores of computed BSE Performance Index as a
function of condition.
LOWCOST

HIGHCOST

LOSSFRAME

4.81
N=24

8.77
N=22

6.70
N=46

GAINFRAME

6.72
N=25

6.81
N=24

6.76
N=49

5.78
N=49

7.75
N=46

Reported below is the average number of times women
performed breast self-exams.

There were no statistically

significant differences across conditions with respect to
this number (two-way interaction: F=2.321,
see Table 6 for mean scores).

(1,91), p~.131);

Again, the expectation that

women in the loss-framed, low-cost condition would perform
BSEs most often was not met; in fact, women in this
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condition performed BSEs the least often.

Table 6. Mean scores of BSE performance as a function of
condition.
LOWCOST

HIGHCOST

LOSSFRAME

.88

1.77

N=24

N=22

1.31
N=46

GAIN-

1.40
N=25

1.42
N=24

1.41
N=49

FRAME

1.15

1.59

N=49

N=46

In an attempt to understand with a broad perspective
what variables were most highly related to and contributing
most to BSE performance, two analyses were performed.
First, correlations were done among BSE performance index
scores and variables measured at the first and second
posttests.

Second, using BSE performance index scores as a

dependent variable and Posttest 1 variables most highly
related to those scores as independent variables, a
regression analysis was performed.
The correlation matrix (see Table 7 below) comprises
only those variables that were significantly related (p5.05)
to the BSE performance index scores.

Those variables were

as follows: BSE attitudes (Posttests 1 and 2); BSE
intentions (Posttests 1 and 2); self-efficacy (Posttests 1
and 2): perceived severity of breast cancer (Posttests 1 and
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2)i and perceived efficacy of BSE (Posttests 1 and 2).
other variables included in the correlation analysis and not
significantly related to BSE performance index scores (at
either posttest) were as follows: breast cancer
susceptibility, Reactance index A, Reactance index B,
Illusion of Control index, MHLC Internal subscale, MHLC
Powerful Others subscale, and MHLC Chance subscale.

Table 7. Correlations between BSE Performance Index scores
and Posttest 1 and Posttest 2 variables.
ATTl ATT2 INTl INT2 SEl
PS
.:5.:

Note:

SE2

SVl

SV2

EFFl EFF2

.264 .381 .350 .451 .246 .256 .188 .263 .184 .301
(91) {93) (95) (93) (93) (93) (93) (93) (95) {93)
.006 .000 .ooo .000 .009 .007 .035 .005 .037 .002
.$.

indicates p,$..

Underlined in Table 7 are those variables used in the
regression analysis to predict BSE performance index scores.
In view of the experimenter's uncertainty as to what
variables would best predict BSE performance index scores
and also of the exploratory nature of these analyses, a
stepwise regression analysis was performed.

The results

from this analysis showed that both BSE intentions and
perceived efficacy of BSE were significant predictors of BSE
performance index scores {See Table 8 below).
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1flble 8. Results of a stepwise regression analysis using BSE
Performance Index scores as the dependent variable.
variables in the Equation
B

variable

SE B Beta T

Sig T

asE intentions 1.47 .455 .323 3.24 .0017
BSE efficacy
.595 .286 .207 2.08 .0408

variables not in the Equation
variable

Beta In

Partial

Min

Toler T

BSE attitudes
self efficacy
BC severity

.094
.113

.088
.117

.734
.903

.805
1.082

.041

.041

.864

.378

Sig T
.4229
.2823
.706

Curiously, perceived efficacy of BSE scores were not
different across conditions, i . e . , the high-cost
conditions, whose subjects had higher scores on the BSE
performance index did not also have higher scores on the
perceived efficacy of BSE items.

Also noteworthy was the

inability of BSE attitude scores to predict BSE performance
index scores; BSE intention scores were a more powerful
predictor.

Finally, the inability of perceived self-

efficacy scores to predict BSE performance index scores was
somewhat surprising given their difference across
conditions, i.e., subjects in high-cost conditions had
higher BSE performance index scores and higher-self-efficacy
scores than did subjects in low-cost conditions but selfefficacy scores could not predict the former.

To be noted,
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however, is the notion that a regression analysis using
independent variables from Posttest 2 might result in
different predictors than did the present one.
· Pamphlet Impact
Mainly as a descriptive effort, women were asked at
the second posttest some questions related to how much they
felt participating in the study affected their attitudes
towards breast self-exams and towards breast cancer.

Eleven

such questions, whose response options ranged from "1," or
"not at all" to "5," or "very, very much," made up this
"Pamphlet Impact" index.

There were no statistically

significant differences (two-way interaction: F=.000,

(1,90)

p~.982; see Table 41 for mean scores) among the four
conditions with respect to their totals on this index.

The

grand mean was 24.63, yielding an average of 2.24/5 for each
item, an average reflecting a response between "not much"
and "somewhat".
Dividing the Pamphlet Impact questions into those
related to breast self-exams and those related to breast
cancer, there were no statistically significant differences
among the four groups ((BSE questions, two-way interaction:
F=.082,

(1,90), p~.775; BC questions, two-way interaction:

F=.131,

(1,90), p~.718); see Tables 42 and 43 for mean

scores).

DISCUSSION
Manipulation Checks
A logical topic with which to begin a discussion of
study results seems to be whether or not the manipulations
were successful.
respect.

In the present study, they were in one

At the first pilot test and at the first and

second posttests, subjects in gain-framed conditions
recalled arguments in gain language significantly more often
than did subjects in loss-framed conditions, subjects in
loss-framed conditions reported arguments in loss language
significantly more often than did subjects in gain-framed
conditions, and subjects in low-cost conditions reported
arguments in terms of low cost significantly more often than
did subjects in high-cost conditions.

Virtually no one, at

any of the tests, however, reported arguments in terms of
high-cost.

Possibly, this lack of reporting was due to the

non-straightforwardness of high-cost messages, as they
conveyed high-cost implicitly rather than explicitly.

Such

implicity was important with respect to the ethical issue of
stating in a blunt manner that breast self-exams are
extremely difficult and time-consuming when in fact the
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opposite is true.
Although the gain-frame, loss-frame, and low-cost
manipulations did appear successful overall, there were some
concerns of confounding of manipulations at the pilot test,
such that subjects in low-cost conditions reported arguments
in gain language more often than did subjects in high-cost
conditions, subjects in high-cost conditions reported
arguments in loss language more often than did subjects in
low-cost conditions, and subjects in the loss-framed, lowcost condition reported arguments in terms of low cost more
often than did subjects in the other conditions.

These

effects, however, were not found again at the first or
second posttests, leading the experimenter to believe that
the effects were not reliable and were possibly due to the
unrefined pamphlet that was improved on with respect to
wording that might possibly confound conditions.
The low recall of cost arguments in general (low-cost
arguments were seldom recalled as were high-cost ones) might
be due to subjects' interpretation of the word "argument."
A statement stressing the importance of doing BSEs (a
"frame" argument) probably resembles an argument more than
does a statement stressing the minimal amount of time
required to perform BSEs.
Also noteworthy with respect to argument recall was
that subjects in gain-framed conditions reported arguments
in gain language more often than subjects in loss-framed
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conditions reported arguments in loss language.

This effect

might be due to the greater ease in remembering gain-framed
arguments, as the loss-framed arguments were structurally
more difficult to remember and recall.
To be noted is that although the manipulation checks
were successful overall, the number of arguments recalled
was very low.

Thus, for some reason (e.g., motivation),

subjects did not perform well on the recall task.

Possibly,

however, they may have correctly perceived the arguments,
and there might be other types of manipulation checks to
assess the accuracy of subjects' argument perception.

For

example, after the experiment, the researcher could present
subjects with two pages of frame arguments and two pages of
cost arguments and then ask subjects to identify which
arguments they had in their pamphlets.

Another type

of manipulation check might be one of perception/evaluation
of the messages.

For example, a check on the cost arguments

might ask how much time and effort is required to do BSE and
a check on the frame arguments might ask what the gains or
losses of doing or not doing BSE are.

These latter kinds of

checks on perception might be related to attitudes even
though the recall check was not.
Accuracy of Measures
Some of the measures tested for reliability were
highly internally reliable, others were acceptably reliable,
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and others were borderline reliable.

Having addressed the

issue of reliability, the question that follows is whether
or not the measures were valid.

To be discussed further on

in the Discussion section is the notion that some of the
measures may not have been valid.

Of special concern were

the Reactance indices, the Helplessness indices, and the
Illusion of Control indices.

All of those were constructed

by the experimenter and were tested for convergent validity.
The analyses indicated a lack of validity.

Valid measures

of these constructs need be developed in future research in
order for a better test of these study and other related
study hypotheses.

Clearly, the interpretation of the

current study results needs consider the question of
validity with respect to those indices, as their lack of
validity might account, in part, for their failure as
predicted mediators between message reception and later
attitudes, intentions, and behaviors.
Cognitive Responses
In both pilot tests and both posttests, there was no
difference across conditions with respect to favorability or
source of cognitive responses.

In fact, the majority of

women at all tests reported "neutral, issue" responses.
Such reporting may not warrant great surprise as BSE is
probably viewed as neither favorable nor unfavorable and was
the topic of the pamphlet.
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Combining the data from the two pilot tests, subjects
with more favorable cognitive responses were somewhat more
likely to have more positive attitudes than were subjects
with unfavorable or neutral cognitive responses.

This

effect, however, was not found again at either posttest.
Given the greater number of subjects at the posttests and
also the marginality of the pilot test results'
significance, the posttest results are probably more
trustworthy, lending support to the conclusion that
favorability of cognitive responses cannot reliably predict
BSE attitudes.

Of course, this finding is contrary to other

research (e.g., Petty

&

Cacioppo, 1981) which has found

that the favorability of cognitive responses can reliably
predict attitudes towards a given attitude object.
Possibly, the lack of variation in the cognitive responses
(i.e., most responses were "neutral") reported by subjects
in this study accounts for their inability to predict BSE
attitudes.
In both pilot tests and both posttests, there was no
difference across conditions with respect to the effects of
favorability and source of cognitive responses on BSE
intentions.

These results, coupled with the cognitive

responses' absence of effect on BSE attitudes lends support
to the conclusion that favorability and source of cognitive
responses did not predict BSE intentions.

Again, however,

should be noted the lack of variation in cognitive responses
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and hence the possibility that this lack could account for
their inability to predict BSE intentions.
Attitudes. Intentions. Self-efficacy. and Behavior
Prior to presenting the results with respect to the
main dependent variables, a brief summary of the hypotheses
regarding them will be outlined.

At the first posttest, all

women were expected to have positive BSE attitudes, great
intentions of performing BSEs, and high self-efficacy in
performing BSEs.

At the second posttest, women in the loss-

framed, low-cost condition were expected to have the most
positive attitudes towards, the greatest intentions of
performing, the highest self-efficacy in performing, and to
have actually performed BSEs most often, followed by those
women in the gain-framed, low-cost condition, followed by
those women in the gain-framed, high-cost condition,
followed by those women in the loss-framed, high-cost
condition.
Having outlined the main study hypotheses, the main
dependent variables will be discussed separately and jointly
with respect to study findings.

At the first posttest,

there was no difference across conditions with respect to
BSE attitudes, intentions, or self-efficacy.

At the second

posttest, women in the high-cost conditions had more
favorable attitudes towards performing breast self-exams
than did women in the low-cost conditions, women in the
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gain-framed and high-cost conditions had greater intentions
of performing breast self-exams than did women in the lossframed and low-cost conditions, and women in the high-cost
conditions reported a greater sense of self-efficacy in
performing breast self-exams than did women in the low-cost
conditions, and finally, women in the high-cost conditions,
and especially those in the loss-framed, high-cost condition
had higher scores on the BSE Performance index than did
women in the other conditions.
Due to the observation that at the first posttest
there were very few differences across conditions but at the
second posttest there were some differences and also to the
observation that attitudes and intentions became more
favorable and greater, respectively, at the second posttest
for women in all but the low-cost, loss-framed condition
(and especially more favorable and greater for women in
high-cost conditions), a repeated measures MANOVA was
performed to test whether or not those differences over time
were significant.

Results from this analysis showed that

women in high-cost conditions changed their attitudes in a
positive manner more than did women in low-cost conditions
[(Cost by BSE attitudes effect: F=4.72,

(1,86), p~.033); see

Table 2 for marginal means]; however, this effect must be
interpreted with respect to an interaction such that women
in high-cost conditions displayed such change only if they
were also in the loss-framed condition (Frame by Cost by BSE

73

attitudes effect: F=4.72,

(1,86), p5.020).

This finding is

strong evidence against the hypothesis that women in the
loss-framed, low-cost condition would show the greatest
positive change in BSE attitudes and that women in the lossframed, high-cost condition would show the least.

Also from

this analysis, results showed that women in gain-framed
conditions tended to change their intentions of performing
BSE in a greater manner more than did women in loss-framed
conditions [(Frame by BSE attitudes effect: F=2.68,
p5.105); see Table 3 for marginal means].

(1,90),

This finding,

too, is contrary to the hypothesis that women in the lowcost, loss-framed condition would show the greatest positive
change in their intentions of performing BSEs.
Related to the above analyses are the cross-lagged
correlations of attitudes and intentions at Posttest 1 and
Posttest 2.

Although attitudes and intentions were

significantly related to each other at Posttest 1 and
Posttest 2, the cross-lagged correlations were somewhat low,
indicating that scores on one measure might not reliably
predict scores on the other measure.

Further related to the

repeated measures analysis results was the finding that
although Posttest 1 BSE attitude scores and BSE intention
scores were significantly related to BSE performance index
scores, only BSE intention scores were reliable predictors
of BSE performance index scores.

Possibly, BSE attitudes

and BSE intentions operate via different processes both in
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the way they are affected by differently-framed messages and
in the way they

affect behavior with respect to those

messages.
In sum, although no differences were found across
conditions on the major dependent variables at the first
posttest, no differences were expected at this time due to
the belief that all women, regardless of condition, would be
highly motivated immediately after receiving their
pamphlets.

As expected, differences were found at the

second posttest, but those differences were contrary to
study expectations.

The major commonality among the

findings was that women in the high-cost conditions had the
most favorable attitudes towards breast self-exams, the
greatest intentions of performing breast self-exams, the
highest self-efficacy with respect to breast self-exams, and
the highest scores on the BSE Performance index.

Possibly,

these findings could find partial explanation in Cognitive
Dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) or other cognitive
consistency theories that view people as rational thinkers.
In line with such theories, women exposed to the message
that performing BSEs will require a great deal of time and
effort might come to believe that such performance must be
very important and worthwhile.

Or, put another way, given

the assumption that most people believe that important
matters (e.g., breast cancer) require great effort (i. e.,
high-cost behavior), the high-cost message might sound more
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realistic and accurate to women than the low-cost message.
rronic is the fact that with respect to the matter at hand
(BSEs), little time and effort really is all that is
required.
Outside of theorizing, a more immediate, empirical
question might be, "What study variables best predict BSE
performance?".

As noted in the Results section, five

Posttest 1 variables that had significant correlations with
BSE performance index scores were entered into a regression
analysis in order to ascertain which of those five
(attitudes towards BSE, intentions of performing BSE,
perceived self-efficacy in performing BSE, perceived
severity of breast cancer, and perceived efficacy of BSE)
might best predict BSE performance.

Of those variables,

only BSE intentions and perceived efficacy of BSE were
significant predictors of BSE performance.

The weakness of

attitudes as a predictor was somewhat surprising, especially
given the high correlation between attitudes and intentions
at the second posttest (See Table 4).

Also surprising was

the weakness of perceived self-efficacy as a predictor,
especially coupled with the strength of perceived efficacy
of BSE as a predictor, i . e . , subjects in high-cost
conditions had higher BSE performance index scores and
higher perceived self-efficacy scores than subjects in other
conditions but they did not have higher BSE efficacy scores.
Psychological Processes
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Reactance. Illusion of Control. and Helplessness
The conditions expected to undergo the different
psychological processes at the two posttests did not do so.
The only difference with respect to those processes was at
the second posttest, at which time women in the low-cost
conditions had higher scores on the Illusion of Control
index than women in the high-cost conditions, this finding
seeming to be a logical one.
Why women did not undergo the expected processes might
be explained in more than one way.

First, the indices used

to measure those processes might not have been valid.
Second, women simply might not have undergone the expected
processes.

Third, both of those explanations could be true.

If there exists the possibility that women in the high-cost
conditions underwent cognitive dissonance or some similar
process, such a process might have been the one around which
to base this study or future studies.
Alternative Explanations
Negativity Bias
As discussed earlier, women in gain-framed conditions
reported arguments in gain language significantly more often
than women in loss-framed conditions reported arguments in
loss language, seeming to rule out the idea that a
negativity bias might be confounding study results.
Although recall may not be capable of reflecting the
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negativity bias, in the context of this study especially,
the negativity bias is very unlikely operating given the
lack of results to indicate that women in the loss-framed
conditions were more positively affected by their messages
in terms of breast self-exam attitudes, intentions, selfefficacy, and behavior.
Fearful Content
As noted above, the likelihood that fearful content
would be operating is not great given the lack of results to
indicate that women in the loss-framed conditions were more
positively affected by their messages.

In fact, the only

difference with respect to fear was at the first posttest,
at which time women in the low-cost conditions reported
greater fear than did women in the high-cost conditions.
Possibly, this finding could be interpreted in terms of
consistency theory, such that women told that performing
BSEs is neither difficult nor time-consuming might then
think that it must be scary.

That is to say, women might

believe that given the seriousness of breast cancer, any
prevention measure must also have some degree of
seriousness, if not in the act itself (a high-cost
behavior), then in its emotionality (e.g., fear).

Or

possibly, women exposed to the low-cost message might think
that they have been given inaccurate or naive information
and resultingly feel scared that they will not be able to
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perform BSE properly, i.e., their fear might stem from
their lack of self-efficacy.
Protection Motivation Theory Variables
The only protection motivation theory variable that
differentiated among women in this study was self-efficacy.
As mentioned earlier, women in the high-cost conditions
reported a greater sense of self-efficacy with respect to
performing BSEs than did women in the low-cost conditions.
This finding was discussed above in terms of cognitive
dissonance (Festinger, 1957).
An Overview
Quite possibly, this study confronted problems at
early phases.

The low message argument recall might have

indicated a weakness in the success of the manipulation.
Also, the lack of validity among the measures intended to
represent different psychological processes might have
contributed to subjects' seemingly random scores on those
measures.

Future research certainly need ascertain in a

more definite manner that the manipulations are successful
and that all study measures are valid.

Despite those study

problems, there were some differences in some of the
subjects• responses across the four conditions.

In general,

the high-cost message seemed to be more effective than the
low-cost message and the loss-framed, low-cost message

79
seemed to be the least effective, findings contrary to
expectations and to Meyerowitz and Chaiken's (1987) results.
The present study might suggest limitations on the
generalizations those authors made with respect to the
greater effectiveness of loss than gain-framed messages.
Already proposed was the notion that Cognitive Dissonance
theory (Festinger, 1957) and other theories that view people
as rational thinkers might help in interpreting the study's
unexpected results.

More explicitly stated, people exposed

to high-cost messages might believe that an act which
requires a good deal of time and effort must be an important
and worthwhile one moreso than people exposed to messages
that stress an act's minimal time and effort.

Of course,

there exist other types of theories that could contend the
ability to interpret the study results.

Future studies,

then, might posit one or more theories in the context of
this or similar studies and attempt to test what theory best
explains the study results.

Such testing might lead to

other studies that attempt to understand what kinds of
messages are most effective in promoting positive attitudes,
intentions, and behaviors with respect to a given issue.

APPENDIX A
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Table 9 . Favorability of cognitive responses as a function
of condition, using data from Pilot tests 1 and 2.

PILOT TEST 1
LOW-COST
LOSSFRAME
GAINFRAME

PILOT TEST 2

HIGH-COST

LOW-COST

FAV:
UNFAV:
NTRL:

0
0
10

FAV:
UNFAV:
NTRL:

7

FAV:
UNFAV:
NTRL:

1
1
10

FAV:
UNFAV:
NTRL:

5

0
7

0
7

HIGH-COST

FAV:
UNFAV:
NRTL:

1
0

FAV:
UNFAV:
NTRL:

1
0

5

5

FAV:
UNFAV:
NTRL:

1
0

FAV:
UNFAV:
NTRL:

0
0

5

6

Table 10. Source of cognitive responses as a function of
condition, using data from Pilot tests 1 and 2.

PILOT TEST 1

PILOT TEST 2

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

MSSGE:
1
ISSUE: 12
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
1

MSSGE:
1
ISSUE: 10
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
4

MSSGE:
0
ISSUE:
4
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
2

MSSGE:
3
ISSUE:
1
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
2

GAINFRAME

MSSGE:
1
ISSUE: 12
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
1

MSSGE:
2
ISSUE:
7
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
3

MSSGE:
0
ISSUE:
4
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
2

MSSGE: 0
ISSUE:
3
MSSGE &
ISSUE: 2
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I,able 11. Mean score results of an ANOVA examining the
effects of cognitive response favorability and
source on BSE attitudes for both Pilot Tests
combined, using Attitude index items 1-11 only.
COGNITIVE RESPONSE FAVORABILITY
FAVORABLE

UNFAVORABLE

NEUTRAL

MESSAGE
SOURCE

70.25

00.00

66.00

N=4

N=0

N=6

ISSUE
SOURCE

69.88
N=8

56.00
N=l

67.79
N=39

MESSAGE &
ISSUE
SOURCE

69.50

00.00
N=0

63.60
N=l0

N=8

Table 12 . Mean-score results of an ANOVA examining the
effects of cognitive response favorability and
source on BSE intentions for both Pilot Tests
combined.
COGNITIVE RESPONSE FAVORABILITY
FAVORABLE
MESSAGE
SOURCE

ISSUE
SOURCE

MESSAGE
ISSUE
SOURCE

&

UNFAVORABLE

o.oo

NEUTRAL

6.25
N=4

N=0

5.83
N=6

6.00
N=8

6.00
N=l

5.87
N=39

6.25
N=8

o.oo
N=0

5.70
N=l0
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xable 13 . Recall of pamphlet arguments in gain language as
a function of condition, using data from Pilot
Test 1.
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

1.60
N=15

.87
N=15

GAINFRAME

3.00
N=12

2.42
n=12

Table 14 . Recall of pamphlet arguments in loss language as
a function of condition, using data from Pilot
Test 1.
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

.73
N=15

1.67
N=15

GAINFRAME

o.oo
N=12

.17
N=12

Table 15. Recall of pamphlet arguments in terms of low-cost
as a function of condition, using data from Pilot
Test 1.
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

.40
N=15

.07
N=15

GAINFRAME

.oo
N=12

.08
N=12
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Table 16. BSE attitudes as a function of condition, using
data from Pilot Test 1.

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

69.47
N=15

68.07
N=15

GAINFRAME

69.08
N=12

71.00
N=12

Table 17 . BSE intentions as a function of condition, using
data from Pilot Test 1.

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

6.20
N=15

5.60
N=l5

GAINFRAME

6.50
N=12

5.83
N=12

Table 18 . BSE attitudes as a function of condition, using
data From Pilot Test 2.

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

83.00
N=8

78.29
N=7

GAINFRAME

71.86
N=7

72.50
N=8
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I_slble 19 . BSE intentions as a function of condition, using
data from Pilot Test 2.
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

5.50
N=8

6.00
N=7

GAINFRAME

5.43
N=7

5.25
N=8

Table 20 . BSE attitudes as a function of condition, using
data from Pilot Tests 1 and 2 combined and
Attitude index Items 1-11 only.
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

68.61
N=23

66.73
N=22

GAINFRAME

65.11
N=l9

66.10
N=20

Table 21. BSE intentions as a function of condition, using
data From Pilot Tests 1 and 2 combined.
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

5.96
N=23

5.73
N=22

GAINFRAME

6.11
N=19

5.60
N=20
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,r_able 22 . Recall of pamphlet arguments in gain language as
a function of condition, using data from
Posttests 1 and 2.

POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST

POSTTEST 2

HIGH-COST LOW-COST

LOSSFRAME

.68
N=28

.32
N=28

GAINFRAME

1.81
N=27

2.00

.96

N=25

N=24

.25
N=24

HIGH-COST
.41
N=22
1.25
N=24

Table 23 . Recall of pamphlet arguments in loss language as
a function of condition, using data from
Posttests 1 and 2.

POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

POSTTEST 2
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

.86
N=28

.76
N=25

.75
N=24

.73
N=22

GAINFRAME

.04
N=27

.00
N=25

.oo

.oo

N=24

N=24

Table 24 . Recall of pamphlet arguments in terms of low cost
as a function of condition, using data from
Posttests 1 and 2.

POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

POSTTEST 2
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

.25
N=28

.08
N=25

.oo

.oo

N=24

N=22

GAINFRAME

.26
N=27

.04
N=25

.04
N=25

N=24

.oo
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T.able 25. Favorability of cognitive responses as a function
of condition, using data from Posttests 1 and 2.
POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST
LOSS-

FRAME
GAIN-

FRAME

HIGH-COST

POSTTEST 2
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

FAV:
2
UNFAV: 3
NTRL: 20

FAV:
3
UNFAV: 1
NTRL: 22

3
FAV:
UNFAV: 0
NTRL: 20

FAV:
0
UNFAV: 1
NTRL: 21

FAV:
3
UNFAV: 1
NTRL: 22

FAV:
1
UNFAV:
2
NTRL: 20

FAV:
1
UNFAV:
3
NTRL: 17

FAV:
2
UNFAV: 0
NTRL: 20

Table 26. Source of cognitive responses as a function of
condition, using data from Posttests 1 and 2.
POSTTEST 1

POSTTEST 2

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

MSSGE:
4
ISSUE: 19
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
2

MSSGE:
2
ISSUE: 16
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
8

MSSGE:
3
ISSUE: 13
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
7

MSSGE:
6
ISSUE: 16
MSSGE &
ISSUE: 1

GAINFRAME

MSSGE:
4
ISSUE: 21
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
3

MSSGE:
1
ISSUE: 19
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
3

MSSGE:
9
ISSUE: 11
MSSGE &
ISSUE:
1

MSSGE: 4
ISSUE: 17
MSSGE &
ISSUE: 1
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I,_able 27 . Mean score results of an ANOVA examining the
effects of cognitive response favorability and
source on BSE attitudes, using data from
Posttests 1 and 2.
POSTTEST 1
FAVORABLE

UNFAVORABLE

NEUTRAL

MESSAGE
SOURCE

68.67
N=3

76.67
N=3

88.00
N=3

ISSUE
SOURCE

80.40
N=5

76.00
N=4

75.02
N=62

MESSAGE
& ISSUE
SOURCE

81. 00
N=l

o.oo
N=0

73.71
N=14

POSTTEST 2
FAVORABLE

UNFAVORABLE

NEUTRAL

MESSAGE
SOURCE

66.67
N=3

76.00
N=3

78.38
N=16

ISSUE
SOURCE

82.00
N=2

0.00
N=0

78.73
N=55

MESSAGE
& ISSUE
SOURCE

90.00
N=l

59.00
N=l

76.57
N=7
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Table 28. Mean score results of an ANOVA examining the
effects of cognitive response favorability and
source on BSE intentions, using data from
Posttests 1 and 2.
POSTTEST 1
FAVORABLE

UNFAVORABLE

NEUTRAL

MESSAGE
SOURCE

7.00
N=3

5.00
N=3

6.33
N=3

ISSUE
SOURCE

5.60
N=5

5.75
N=4

5.70
N=66

MESSAGE
& ISSUE
SOURCE

6.00
N=l

o.oo
N=0

5.80
N=15

POSTTEST 2
FAVORABLE

UNFAVORABLE

NEUTRAL

MESSAGE
SOURCE

5.67
N=3

5.67
N=3

6.13
N=16

ISSUE
SOURCE

6.00
N=2

o.oo
N=0

5.80
N=55

MESSAGE
& ISSUE
SOURCE

7.00
N=l

7.00
N=l

5.43
N=7

Table 29 . Mean scores of self-efficacy as a function of
condition, using data from Posttests 1 and 2.
POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST

POSTTEST 2

HIGH-COST

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

10.29
N=28

10.93
N=27

10.79
N=24

11.91
N=22

GAINFRAME

10.75
N=28

11.37
N=27

11.32
N=25

12.00
N=24
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Table 30 . Mean scores of the MHLC Internal subscale as a
function of condition, using data from Posttests
1 and 2.
POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST

POSTTEST 2

HIGH-COST

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

27.64

26.89

27.50

27.00

N=28

N=28

N=24

N=22

GAINFRAME

26.56
N=27

26.68
N=28

25.60
N=25

26.75
N=24

Table 31. Mean scores of the "Reactance" index, Part A, as
function of condition, using data from Posttests
1 and 2.
POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST

POSTTEST 2

HIGH-COST

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

39.35
N=26

41.93
N=28

44.58
N=24

46.45
N=22

GAINFRAME

38.93
N=27

38.58

40.08

N=26

N=25

44.46
N=24

Table 32. Mean scores of the "Reactance" index, Part B, as a
function of condition, using data from Posttests 1
and 2.
POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST

POSTTEST 2

HIGH-COST

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

59.33
N=27

60.32
N=28

60.71
N=24

58.27
N=22

GAINFRAME

57.58
N=27

61.15
N=27

59.32
N=25

60.71
N=24
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Table 33. Intercorrelations among MHLC Internal subscale zscores, "Reactance" index, Part AZ-scores, and
"Reactance" index, Part B Z-scores, using data
from Posttests 1 and 2 (Pl and P2).
REACTB

REACTA

MHLCI

MHLC,
INTERNAL
SUBSCALE
(MHLCI)

Pl: 1.0000
(111)
P=.
P2: 1. 0000
(95)
P= .

REACTANCE
INDEX, PART A
(REACTA)

Pl: • 0157
(106)
P=.437
P2: -.2615
(95)
P=.005

Pl: 1.0000
(107)
P=.
P2: 1.0000
(95)
P=.

REACTANCE
INDEX, PART B
(REACTB)

Pl: .2622
(108)
P=.003
P2: .2226
(95)
P=.015)

Pl: -.1244
(106)
P=.102
P2: .0877
(95)
P=.199

Pl: 1.0000
(109)
P=.
P2: 1.0000

(95)
P=.

Table 34. Mean scores of item reflecting breast cancer
susceptibility as a function of condition, using
data from Posttests 1 and 2.
POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST

POSTTEST 2

HIGH-COST

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

3.96
N=28

3.46
N=28

3.54
N=24

3.68
N=22

GAINFRAME

4.04
N=28

3.89
N=27

3.68
N=25

4.29
N=24
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Table 35 . Mean scores of the items reflecting BSE efficacy
as a function of condition, using data from
Posttests 1 and 2.
POSTTEST 2

POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

11.18
N=28

11.29
N=28

11.00
N=24

12.00
N=22

GAINFRAME

10.71
N=28

11.21
N=28

11.12
N=25

11.46
N=24

Table 36 . Mean scores of the "Illusion of Control" index as
a function of condition, using data from
Posttests 1 and 2.
POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST

POSTTEST 2

HIGH-COST

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

24.52
N=25

25.31
N=26

27.59
N=22

23.73
N=22

GAINFRAME

26.39
N=23

25.77
N=26

27.36
N=25

24.79
N=24
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Table 37. Intercorrelations among Breast Cancer
Susceptibility z-score, BSE efficacy z-score, and
"Illusion of Control" index Z-score, using data
from Posttests 1 and 2 (Pl and P2).
BSEEFF

BCSS
BREAST
CANCER
SUSCEPTIBILITY
(BCSS)

Pl:

BREAST
SELF-EXAM
EFFICACY
(BSEEFF)

Pl:

ILLUSION
OF CONTROL
(ILLCNTL)

P2:

P2:

Pl:
P2:

ILLCNTL

1.0000
(111)
P=.
1.0000
(95)
P=.
.1223
(111)
P=.100
-.2158
(95)
P=.018

Pl:

.1922
(100)
P=.028
.0690
(93)
P=.256

Pl:

-.0332
(100)
P=.371

Pl: 1.0000
(100)
P=.

P2:

-.2138
(93)
P=.020

P2: 1.0000
(93)

P2:

1.0000
(112)
P=.
1.0000
(95)
P=.

P=.

Table 38. Mean numbers of gain- and loss-framed arguments
recalled as a function of respective gain- and
loss-framed conditions, using data from Posttests
1 and 2.
GAIN-FRAMED:
LOSS-FRAMED:
# GAIN ARGUMENTS# LOSS ARGUMENTS

POSTTEST 1

1.904
N=52

.811
N=53

POSTTEST 2

1.104
N=48

.739
N=46
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Table 39 • Mean scores of cognitive responses reflecting
fear as· a function of condition, using data from
Posttests 1 and 2.

POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST

POSTTEST 2

HIGH-COST

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

.22
N=27

.12
N=26

.08

.09

N=24

N=22

GAINFRAME

.19
N=26

.04
N=24

.04
N=25

N=24

.oo

Table 40 . Mean scores of perceived severity of breast
cancer as a function of condition, using data
from Posttests 1 and 2.
POSTTEST 1
LOW-COST

POSTTEST 2

HIGH-COST

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

6.18
N=28

6.18
N=28

6.08
N=24

6.14
N=22

GAINFRAME

6.08
N=26

6.04
N=28

6.04
N=25

6.38
N=24

Table 41 . Mean total scores of Pamphlet Impact
Questionnaire as a function of condition, using
data from Posttest 2.

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

26.33
N=24

24.77
N=22

GAINFRAME

24.46
N=24

22.96
N=24
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Table 42. Mean scores of Pamphlet Impact questions related
to breast self-exams, using data from Posttest 2.

LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

11.50
N=24

11.09
N=22

GAINFRAME

10.79
N=24

10.04
N=24

Table 43. Mean scores of Pamphlet Impact questions related
to breast cancer, using data from Posttest 2.
LOW-COST

HIGH-COST

LOSSFRAME

12.33
N=24

11.32
N=22

GAINFRAME

11.38
N=24

10.88
N=24

APPENDIX B
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BSE Attitudes Pretest
For each of the following statements, please place an "X" on
the line that indicates the position with which you agree
most.
1. I feel that vigorous exercise is:
enjoyable

unenjoyable

2. I believe that vigorous exercise is:
harmful

beneficial

3. I feel that a good night's rest is:
enjoyable

unenjoyable

4. I believe that a good night's rest is:
beneficial

harmful

5. I feel that performing breast self-exams is:
harmful

beneficial

6. I believe that performing breast self-exams is:
unenjoyable

enjoyable

7. I feel that smoking cigarettes is:
enjoyable

unenjoyable

8. I believe that smoking cigarettes is:
beneficial

harmful

9. I feel that eating well-balanced meals is:
unenj oyable _

enjoyable

10. I believe that eating well-balanced meals is:
harmful

beneficial

11. I feel that taking care of myself when I am sick is:
beneficial

harmful

12. I believe taking care of myself when I am sick is:
enjoyable

unenjoyable
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Measure of Perceived susceptibility to Breast Cancer
Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the likelihood that
you will get breast cancer.

1

no likelihood

2

3

4

5

6

7

very great
likelihood
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Measure of Perceived Severity of Breast Cancer

Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the extent to which
you think that breast cancer is a frightening and dangerous
disease.

1

2

not at all
frightening
and dangerous

3

4

5

6

7

extremely
frightening
and
dangerous
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Measure of Beliefs in BSE's Efficacy

Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the effectiveness of
breast self-exams in diagnosing breast cancer.

1

2

3

4

5

no
effectiveness

6

7

very high
effectiveness

Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the likelihood that
breast self-exams can affect one's health.

1

no
likelihood

2

3

4

5

6

7

very great
likelihood
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Measure of Perceived Self-Efficacy in Performing BSE

Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, how confident you are
that performing a breast self-exam will enable you to detect
a lump in your breasts.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

extremely
confident

not at all
confident

Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the likelihood that
you can learn to perform a breast self-exam effectively.

1

no
likelihood

2

3

4

5

6

7

very great
likelihood
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Measure of Cognitive Responses

Often, one reflects on what one is reading.

Please write

down all the thoughts that occurred to you while reading
your pamphlet.

Be assured that no thoughts are more valid

than other thoughts; all of your thoughts are valuable.
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Measure of Pamphlet Argument and Procedure Recall

Please write down the arguments that the pamphlet you read
mentioned with respect to the importance of performing
breast self-exams.

Then, please write down the correct

procedure your pamphlet outlined for performing breast selfexams.
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Wallston et al.

(1978) MHLC Scale. Form A

Please indicate your agreement (disagreement) with each of
the following items, "1" being "strongly disagree," and "6"
being "strongly agree."
1. If I get sick, it is my own behavior which determines how
soon I will get well again.
1

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree

strongly
disagree

2. No matter what I do, if I am going to get sick, I will
get sick.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

3. Having regular contact with my physician is the best way
for me to avoid illness.
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree

4. Most things that affect my health happen to me by
accident.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

5. Whenever I don't feel well, I should consult a medically
trained professional.
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree
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6. I am in control of my own health.
2

1

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

7. My family has a lot to do with my becoming sick or

staying healthy.
1

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree

strongly
disagree
8. When I get sick I am to blame.

1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

9. Luck plays a big part in determining how soon I will
recover from an illness.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

10. Health professionals control my health.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

11. My good health is largely a matter of good fortune.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

12. The main thing which affects my health is what I myself

do.
1

strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree
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13. If I take care of myself, I can avoid illness.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strong:J_y
agree

14. When I recover from an illness, it's usually because
other people (for example, doctors, nurses, family,
friends) have been taking care of me.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree
15. No matter what I do,
1

6

strongly
agree

2

3

I'm likely to get sick.
4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

16. If it's meant to be, I will stay healthy.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

17. If I take the right actions, I can stay healthy.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

18. Regarding my health, I can only do what my doctor tells

me to do.
1

strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree
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Wallston et al.

(1978) MHLC Scale. Form B

Please indicate your agreement (disagreement) with each of
the following items, "1" being "strongly disagree" and "6"
being "strongly agree."
I have the power to make myself well

1. If I become sick,

again.
1

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree

strongly
disagree

2. Often I feel that no matter what I do, if I am going to
get sick, I will get sick.
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree

3. If I see an excellent doctor regularly, I am less likely
to have health problems.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

4. It seems that my health is greatly influenced by
accidental happenings.
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree

5. I can only maintain my health by consulting health
professionals.
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree

6. I am directly responsible for my own health.
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree
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7. Other people play a big part in whether I stay healthy or
become sick.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

8. Whatever goes wrong with my health is my own fault.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

9. When I am sick, I just have to let nature run its course.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

10. Health professionals keep me healthy.
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree

11. When I stay healthy, I'm just plain lucky.
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree

12. My physical well-being depends on how well I take care
of myself.
1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

13. When I feel ill, I know it is because I have not been
taking care of myself properly.
1

strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree
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14. The type of care I receive from other people is what is
responsible for how well I recover from an illness.
2

1

3

4

5

strongly
disagree
15. Even when I
2

1

take care of myself, it's easy to get sick.
3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree
become ill, it's a matter of fate.

16. When I
1

6

strongly
agree

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

can pretty much stay healthy by taking good care of
myself.

17. I

1

2

3

4

5

strongly
disagree

6

strongly
agree

18. Regarding my health, I can only do what my doctor tells

me to do.
1

strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

strongly
agree
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Reactance Measure. A Description

The theory of reactance (J. W. Brehm, 1966;

s. s.

Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wortman & Brehm, 1975) maintains that
several responses can follow a loss of control.

The first

is hostility or aggressive feelings; this response was
tested by observing the cognitive responses of the subjects.
The second is direct efforts to restore lost freedoms; this
response was tested by inspection of the MHLC scores.
Scores for those people experiencing reactance should have
been higher on the internal scale than scores for those
people not experiencing reactance.

The third is changes in

perceptions of the outcomes, threatened or arbitrarily
eliminated outcomes becoming more attractive and outcomes
that remain available losing some of their attraction; this
response was tested by the following indices.

Subjects

experiencing reactance should have had lower scores on the
first index and higher scores on the second index than
subjects not experiencing reactance.
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Reactance Index. Part A
Please indicate, by circling the number that most accurately
describes your position, how much you value the following
ideals, ideals often threatened by having breast cancer,

11

being "not at all value," and "7" being "value very. very
much."

l=not at all
2=very little
3=little
4=somewhat
5=pretty much
6=very much
?=very, very much

very,
very
much

not at
all
1. good health

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. relaxation

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. a worry-free life

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. time for loved ones

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. own physical
appearance

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. sexual identity

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8. a long life

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9. secure employment

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10. an active lifestyle

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. secure financial

status

1 11
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Reactance Index. Part B
Please indicate, by circling the number that most accurately
describes your position, how much the following options,
options available to someone with breast cancer, would
appeal to you, "1" being, "would not at all appeal to me,"
and "7" being, "would appeal to me very, very much."
l=not at all
2=very little
3=little
4=somewhat
S=pretty much
6=very much
?=very, very much
very,
very
much

not at
all
1. having a breast removed

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. writing a book about your
experience

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. having radiation or other
treatment

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. giving talks to women who
have been diagnosed as
having breast cancer

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. "helping out" science by
trying out new treatments
for breast cancer patients

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. having follow-up surgery

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. attending breast cancer
patient support groups

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8. having reconstructive
surgery

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9. sharing your experience
with significant others

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10. working for an
organization that does
research on breast cancer

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Helplessness Measure. A Description
Helplessness (Wortman
opposite of reactance.

&

Brehm, 1975) is the near

As such, the responses that were

expected to follow from helplessness are the opposite of
those that were expected to follow from reactance.

The

first is helpless feelings; again, this response was tested
by observing the cognitive responses of subjects.

The

second is no direct efforts to restore lost freedoms; this
response, too, was tested by inspection of MHLC scores.
Scores for those people experiencing helplessness should
have been lower on the internal subscale than scores for
those people not experiencing helplessness.

Third, changes

in perceptions of the outcomes would not be expected; this
response was tested by the index used for reactance.
Subjects experiencing helplessness should have had lower
scores on the first part and higher scores on the second
part than subjects not experiencing helplessness.
Illusion of Control Measure. A Description
Illusion of control .(Langer, 1975) was tested by three
expected responses.

First, subjects were asked to indicate

their perceived susceptibility of getting breast cancer.
Subjects experiencing an illusion of control should have
perceived themselves to be less susceptible than those
people not experiencing an illusion of control.

Second,

subjects were asked about their beliefs in BSE's efficacy
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(The more skill-related cues that are present in a chance
situation, the more likely one will manifest an illusion of
control (Langer

&

Roth, 1975; Wortman, 1975)); possibly,

subjects experiencing an illusion of control should have
paid more attention to such cues, i.e., BSE effectiveness.
Subjects experiencing an illusion of control, then, should
have rated BSE's efficacy higher than those subjects not
experiencing an illusion of control.

Third, subjects were

given the following list of superstitions associated with
breast cancer and were asked to indicate their agreement
with the list items (Persons undergoing an illusion of
control often maintain superstitious beliefs).

Subjects

experiencing an illusion of control then, should have had
higher scores on the following index than subjects not
experiencing an illusion of control.
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Illusion of Control Index
Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, how much you agree
(disagree) with the following statements.

l=very strongly disagree
2=strongly disagree
3=somewhat disagree
4=neither agree nor disagree
5=somewhat agree
6=strongly agree
?=very strongly agree

1.

Amply endowed women have a much higher breast cancer risk
than women who are not amply endowed.
1

2

3

4

5

6

very
strongly
disagree
2.

very
strongly
agree

If I had a lump in one of my breasts, I would most
likely know it.
1

2

3

4

5

6

very
strongly
disagree
3.

7

7

very
strongly
agree

Women who perform breast self-exams regularly have an
increased chance of finding a lump if one is there.
1

very
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
strongly
agree
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4. Silicone inserts, used to enlarge the breasts, can
increase a woman's breast cancer risk.
1

2

3

4

5

6

very
strongly
disagree

7

very
strongly
agree

5. Women who have been hit or bumped on a breast have a
greater chance of getting breast cancer than women who
have had no such injury.
1

2

3

4

5

6

very
strongly
disagree
6.

7

very
strongly
agree

Women who have their doctors show them how to perform
breast self-exams are more likely to find a lump if one
is there.
1

2

3

4

5

6

very
strongly
disagree

7

very
strongly
agree

7. As long I eat well and exercise regularly, I don't have
to worry too much about getting breast cancer.
1

2

3

4

5

6

very
strongly
disagree

7

very
strongly
agree

8. If breast cancer does not run in a woman's family, she
can feel pretty sure that she won't get it.
1

very
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
strongly
agree
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9. Breast cancer is a major cause of illness and death among

American women today.
1

2

3

4

5

6

very
strongly
disagree

7

very
strongly
agree

10. I'm too young to worry about getting breast cancer.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
strongly
agree

very
strongly
disagree

11. Women who breastfeed their children have a higher chance
of getting breast cancer than women who do not
breastfeed.
1

2

3

4

5

6

very
strongly
disagree
12.

7

very
strongly
agree

The best way a woman can protect herself from breast
cancer is through early detection and prompt treatment.
1

very
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
strongly
agree
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Measure of Attitudes towards BSE
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of
the following statements, 11 1 11 being "very strongly
disagree," and 11 7 11 being "very strongly agree."
1. I think performing a breast self-exam is an act of
survival.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
strongly
agree

very
strongly
disagree

2. Performing breast self-exams is something I should do
with no hesitation.
1

2

3

4

5

6

very
strongly
disagree

7

very
strongly
agree

3. I believe breast self-exams are crucial to breast cancer
detection.
1

2

3

4

5

6

very
strongly
disagree

7

very
strongly
agree

4. I feel breast self-exams are one of many "life or death"
health behaviors.
1

very
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
strongly
agree
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5. I feel breast self-exams are extremely important in
promoting good health.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
strongly
agree

very
strongly
disagree

6. Performing breast self-exams would make me feel 100%
better about my health.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
strongly
agree

very
strongly
disagree

7. I think the decision to perform breast self-exams is the
smartest one a woman could make.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
strongly
agree

very
strongly
disagree

8. I believe performing breast self-exams would make me feel
a great deal safer with respect to my health.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
strongly
agree

very
strongly
disagree

9. I feel performing breast self-exams is an act in which
all women should engage.
1

very
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
strongly
agree
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10. Breast self-exams should be performed on an extremely
regular basis.
1

2

3

4

5

6

very
strongly
disagree

7

very
strongly
agree

11. I feel I should perform breast self-exams because I know
my body a great deal better than anyone else does.
1

2

3

4

5

7

6

very
strongly
disagree

very
strongly
agree

12. Women who do not perform breast self-exams are taking a

huge risk of getting breast cancer.
1

2

3

4

5

7

6

very
strongly
disagree

very
strongly
agree

13. I can't imagine not performing breast self-exams.
1

2

3

4

5

6

very
strongly
disagree

7

very
strongly
agree

14. I feel that performing breast self-exams is the best
thing a woman could do for herself.
1

very
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
strongly
agree
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Measure of Intentions of Performing BSE
Please indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, the likelihood that
you will perform breast self-exams in the future.

1

no
likelihood

2

3

4

5

6

7

very great
likelihood
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BSE Performance Index
Please indicate how many times since you read your pamphlet
on breast self-exams and filled out the study questionnaire
you performed a breast self-exam.

How careful were you each time you performed a breast selfexam?
1

not at all
careful

2

not very
careful

3

somewhat
careful

4

very
careful

5

extremely
careful

How thorough were you each time you performed a breast selfexam?
1

not at all
thorough

2

not very
thorough

3

somewhat
thorough

4

5

very
extremely
thorough thorough
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Measure of Pamphlet Impact
la,b. Since you read the pamphlet on BSE and filled out the
questionnaire, how much have you thought about breast
self-exams? About breast cancer?
not at
all

not very
much

somewhat

pretty
much

a lot

2a,b. Since you filled out the questionnaire, how much have
you talked about breast self-exams? About breast
cancer?
not at
all

not very
much

somewhat

pretty
much

a lot

3a,b. Since you filled out the questionnaire, how much have
you read about breast self-exams? About breast
cancer?
not at
all

not very
much

somewhat

pretty
much

a lot

4a,b. Since you filled out the questionnaire, how much have
you seen in the media about breast self-exams? About
breast cancer?
nothing

not very
much

somewhat

pretty
much

a lot

5a,b. How much do you think reading the pamphlet changed
your outlook on breast self-exams? On breast cancer?
On your health in general?
not at
all

not very
much

somewhat

pretty
much

a lot

APPENDIX C
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Pamphlet Contents. Page 1: Basic Facts
BASIC FACTS

Breast cancer is a major cause of illness and death
among American women today.

About one woman out of every 10

in the United States will develop breast cancer during her
lifetime.

Until the disease can be prevented, the best way

to protect yourself is through early detection and prompt
treatment.

The American Cancer Society recommends that all

women perform breast self-exams (BSEs).

It is important for you to be familiar with your own
breasts.

After you learn how your normal breast tissue

feels, you will be able to recognize a change if one occurs.
You will increase your ability to feel different structures
in your breast tissue by doing a self-exam every month.

BSE is an important part of early detection.
most lumps are found by women themselves.

In fact,

The BSE

guidelines are designed to help you feel confident in doing
BSE each month.
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Pamphlet Contents. Page 2: Gain-framed. Low-Cost Message
"What are the consequences of doing breast self-exams?"

--By doing breast self-exams now, you can prevent
breast cancer from becoming fatal.
--By doing breast self-exams now, you can know
how your normal, healthy breasts feel.
--By doing breast self-exams, you can take pride
in yourself for caring about your health.
--By doing breast self-exams now, you will have an
increased chance of living a long, healthy life.
--By doing breast self-exams now, you will
probably not have to have your breasts removed
if breast cancer is discovered.
--By doing breast self-exams now, you will
probably not find a tumor that is not treatable.
--By doing breast self-exams now, you should not
have to worry about dying from breast cancer.
--By doing breast self-exams now, you are not
taking a huge risk with respect to your health.
"How much time and effort are involved?"
--Doing breast self-exams requires only five
minutes of your time per month.
--Doing breast self-exams is a very simple
procedure.
--In doing breast self-exams, you can choose one
of three patterns, the one that is easiest for
you.
--Breast self-exams can be done in a variety of
places, e.g., in the shower, in bed, or in
front of a mirror.
--Doing breast self-exams is probably one of the
easiest of all health behaviors.
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Pamphlet Contents. Page 2: Gain-framed. High-cost Message
"What are the consequences of doing breast self-exams?"
--By doing breast self-exams now, you can prevent
breast cancer from becoming fatal.
--By doing breast self-exams now, you can know
how your normal, healthy breasts feel.
--By doing breast self-exams, you can take pride
in yourself for caring about your health.
--By doing breast self-exams now, you will have an
increased chance of living a long, healthy life.
--By doing breast self-exams now, you will
probably not have to have your breasts removed
if breast cancer is discovered.
--By doing breast self-exams now, you will
probably not find a tumor that is not treatable.
--By doing breast self-exams now, you should not
have to worry about dying from breast cancer.
--By doing breast self-exams now, you are not
taking a huge risk with respect to your health.
"How much time and effort are involved?"
--Doing breast self-exams requires regularity
(examine the same time each month), complete
coverage (examine all of your breast),
consistent pattern, use of finger pads (press
with top third of fingers), and adequate
pressure (massage to feel deep breast tissue).
--In addition to doing breast self-exams every
month, you should have a breast exam by your
doctor at least every three years and a
mammogram between the ages of 35 to 39.
--In doing breast self-exams, you should
painstakingly choose one of three patterns: the
circular pattern, vertical strip, or the wedge.
--Breast self-exams should be done in one or more
of several carefully chosen places, e.g., in
the shower, in bed, or in front of a mirror.
--Doing breast self-exams is probably one of the
most involving of all health behaviors.
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Pamphlet Contents. Page 2: Loss-framed. Low-cost Message
"What are the consequences of not doing breast self
exams?"
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you cannot
prevent breast cancer from becoming fatal.
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you cannot
know how your normal, healthy breasts feel.
--By not doing breast self-exams, you cannot take
pride in yourself for caring about your health.
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you will not
have an increased chance of living a long,
healthy life.
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you will
probably have to have your breasts removed if
breast cancer is discovered.
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you may one
day find a tumor that is not treatable.
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you may have
to worry about dying from breast cancer.
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you are
taking a huge risk with respect to your health.
"How much time and effort are involved?"
--Doing breast self-exams requires only five
minutes of your time per month.
--Doing breast self-exams is a very simple
procedure.
--In doing breast self-exams, you can choose one
of three patterns, the one that is easiest for
you.
--Breast self-exams can be done in a variety of
places, e.g., in the shower, in bed, or in
front of a mirror.

--Doing breast self-exams is probably one of the
easiest of all health behaviors.
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Pamphlet Contents. Page 2: Loss-framed. High-cost Message
"What are the consequences of not doing breast selfexams?"
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you cannot
prevent breast cancer from becoming fatal.
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you cannot
know how your normal, healthy breasts feel.
--By not doing breast self-exams, you cannot take
pride in yourself for caring about your health.
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you will not
have an increased chance of living a long life.
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you will
probably have to have your breasts removed if
breast cancer is discovered.
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you may one
day find a tumor that is not treatable.
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you may have
to worry about dying from breast cancer.
--By not doing breast self-exams now, you are
taking a huge risk with respect to your health.
"How much time and effort are involved?"
--Doing breast self-exams requires regularity
(examine the same time each month), complete
coverage (examine all of your breast),
consistent pattern, use of finger pads (press
with top third of fingers), and adequate
pressure.
--In addition to doing breast self-exams every
month, you should have a breast exam by your
doctor at least every three years and a
mammogram between the ages of 35 to 39.
--In doing breast self-exams, you should
painstakingly choose one of three patterns: the
circular pattern, vertical strip, or the wedge.
--Breast self-exams should be done in one or more
of several carefully chosen places, e.g., in
the shower, in bed, or in front of a mirror.
--Doing breast self-exams is probably one of the
most involving of all health behaviors.
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Pamphlet Contents. Page 3; How to do BSE

HOW TO DO BSE

1. Lie down.

Flatten your right breast by placing a pillow

under your right shoulder.

If your breasts are large, use

your right hand to hold your right breast while you do the
exam with your left hand.
2. Use the sensitive pads of the middle three fingers on
your left hand.

Feel for lumps using a rubbing motion.

3. Press firmly enough to feel different breast tissues.
4. Completely feel all of the breast and chest area to cover
breast tissue that extends toward the shoulder.

Allow

enough time for a complete exam.
5. Use the same pattern to feel every part of the breast
tissue.

The diagrams on the next page show the three

patterns preferred by women and their doctors: the circular,
clock or oval pattern, the vertical strip and the wedge.
6. After you have completely examined your right breast,
then examine your left breast using the same method.
Compare what you have felt in one breast with the other.
7. You may also want to examine your breasts while bathing,
when your skin is wet and lumps may be easier to feel.
8. You can check your breasts in a mirror looking for any
change in size or contour, dimpling of the skin or
spontaneous nipple discharge.
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Pamphlet Contents, Page 4: How to do BSE, cont'd.

Your monthly BSE should be carried out when your
breasts are likely to be the least lumpy.

If you have a

regular menstrual cycle, you should examine your breasts at
the end of your menstrual period.

If you do not have

menstrual periods, BSE should be done on the same day of
every month.

If you notice any changes, see your doctor without
delay.

Take the opportunity whenever you see your doctor to

discuss how to do BSE and what you feel when you do selfexams.

Ask if you are doing BSE correctly and for comments

to improve your BSE skills.

Remember, the best means of controlling breast cancer
is by finding it early.

Talk with your doctor.

As

partners, you will want to share information and you'll want
to request advice on where to go to have a mammogram and how
often you need to have the exams done.
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